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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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CHRISTIANITY IN ITS CONFLICT WITH FREUDIANISM

BY GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK, PH.D.

DURING the past decade Freudianism, directly and indirectly, has been gaining a dominating sway over the thought of our age. During the past year its very success has aroused the militant opposition of orthodox Christianity—as revealed especially by the recent conviction of Mrs. M. W. Dennett for sending thru the mails her booklet, *The Sex Side of Life*. The success of Freudianism, as well as the opposition which it has aroused, renders it imperative that its attitude to Christianity be given wide publicity and be subjected to a careful examination. Professor Freud in his book, *The Future of an Illusion*, maintains—to quote him freely—that religion is the universal neurosis; that it has never succeeded in making men even happy; that it is responsible for the relative degeneration of the adult over the normal child; that the legitimate demands of culture can be enforced upon all individuals—except the hopelessly insane—by the same rational methods as those by which they are now enforced upon the neurotic, so that religion is no longer necessary for that purpose. And he believes that in view of the results so far achieved by psycho-analysis, when its appeal to the reason to observe laws evidently necessary for our social good, is generally substituted for the authoritative commands of religion to observe a medley of laws—many of which are contrary to social advantage—mankind will enter upon an experience of social order and individual peace such as it has never known in the past.

Is Professor Freud justified in his condemnation of religion? In considering this question we should notice three admissions that he makes in the course of his discussion: (1) That in the past religion has aided man to control the world by personalizing it. (2) That dogmas are “fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most in-

sistent wishes of mankind." (3) That we can "know reality by our senses because our senses are the product of reality and we are not interested in other worlds." But, in the first place, since it is the task of mankind to control the world (inanimate, personal and social), and since the ability of psycho-analysis to do so is the reason why Freud claims that *it* gives us a real knowledge of truth, religion also must be said to do so, since it has aided us in the same project. And, in the second place, it used to be said by agnostics that the dogmas of religion are not true because they do not appeal to what the agnostics considered the only fundamental power in the human constitution, that is, pure reason. They regarded their own beliefs as valid because, they claimed, their beliefs *were* in accord with an ineradicable faculty of the human soul. But now when with a broader knowledge of the constitution of the soul, it is discovered that the dogmas of religion do appeal to one of its constituents, namely the desires, the fact of such appeal is no longer held to be important, as decisive for the affirmation of their truth. The fact that the natural history of a belief can be traced should cast no aspersions upon its truth. But the fact that a belief rests upon a fundamental power of the soul provides it with a foundation which no human being can ever escape far enough from consistently to deny. Various desires may pass away or after many days be satisfied. But desire for some form of redemption and vindication—the only necessary constituents of religion—cannot pass away as long as the human soul survives. And, in the third place, if we "know reality by our senses because our senses are the product of reality," then we know reality by our desires because they, too, are the product of reality.

We must conclude, therefore, that some religious faith is possible in spite of the findings of psycho-analysis. But what shall be its form? What specific dogmas may we entertain? What doctrines will aid us to achieve personal unification, and integration into society—the necessary aim of every living creature,—an integration which implies a corresponding reform of society to permit the integration? In the present paper we cannot hope to formulate a creed, but we can determine the general nature of a creed to which men acquainted with psycho-analysis may subscribe and so resolve the conflict between it and Christianity. In order to do so let us study that article of faith most likely to appear in every creed: that God is at once infinite in His justice and mercy and inscrutable

in His ordering of human lives. (See, for instance, *A Brief Statement of the Reformed Faith*, adopted by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in 1902.) The conclusions at which we shall arrive from our study of the one article, a study of any other article would but confirm.

The first response to the article of faith which we have chosen for study must be the conviction that it is self-contradictory. A person whose actions cannot be understood cannot be declared to be morally perfect. It would therefore seem that we must reject our typical article of faith in toto altho it is fundamental to every other article of faith which could be devised. And yet, if we think about the nature of experience, with which all creeds must accord, we must acknowledge that it contains a contradiction precisely analogous to that which we find in the creed. To act at all in experience we must presuppose that it has meaning, and so that every part is justified as a constituent part of the whole, that is, that life is just and even good,—although at every step there are evils which blind us to the final purpose and cannot be justified piecemeal. But this is essentially what the credal article affirms, and is quite as self-contradictory as the article. Since the article is self-contradictory but is true to essential experience, and so cannot be completely discarded, we must conclude that its helpfulness to a person in achieving personal and social integration would depend upon his state of mind at the time of his employment of it, and so upon the aspect of the article which he would select to apply to his own life. If at the time of employment, he were overwhelmed by the inherent injustice of life—caused, for instance, by unfortunate love affairs or inability to earn an honest living in a world of which John Jay Chapman declares: "The attention of everyone in the United States is on someone else's opinion, not on truth,"—then belief in God's justice and love might cause him to refurbish his infantile father-image, which would prevent his reacting practically to the real world,—till, with greater misfortunes and more extreme dependence upon the father-image for protection, he might lose all sense of reality, thus being insane.

Or he might turn his libido in upon itself to determine wherein he has so deeply sinned as to deserve the evils he has experienced,—all greatly intensified because of their moral implications in his thought, and develop a highly overwrought conscience, which cannot judge relative values, but hour after hour torments itself over trifling misdeeds of the past.

Or again, his mind might become centered upon the problem of how ineluctable evil can lead to an experience of peace and vindication for himself and all men—which infinite love should guarantee as the guerdon for “the end of days,” and at length in despair turn away from the real world to one of delusion.

Or the article of faith which we are studying might cause the bewildered man to consider that in it he finds confirmation for his despair of finding any meaning, purpose or value in life; and so, again, force him to turn in upon himself till he reaches his primitive self, which was not sensitive to hopes and fears but lived only in the sensuous present. To such a person God is just and God is love, but He wields an inscrutable justice and He woos us to Himself with an insane love.

Or the believer might be caught between the various fates which I have described; and in order to avoid them, momentarily tend to lose faith in his creed, and so merely become one of that vast army which Professor Freud has thus described from his knowledge of the souls of multitudes of men laid bare: “Countless people have been tortured by the same doubts, which they would fain have suppressed because they held themselves in duty bound to believe, and since then many brilliant intellects have been wrecked upon this conflict [between doubt and belief] and many characters have come to grief through the compromises by which they sought a way out.”

But if the would-be believer comes to his creed with smug self-satisfaction; if success has made distress seem only a far-off possibility, then belief in a holy but inscrutable God might cause him to receive his success as the badge of distinguished merit from his God. Gradually he might separate himself altogether from the ranks of humanity and conceive himself an incarnate God with all power given to him in heaven and in earth. Indeed, this often happens. The inscrutability of God’s providence would protect him from ever having to stop and ask himself why God had chosen him for supreme honor and glory. As a devout and consistent believer he could give himself up without reserve to what is known among psychiatrists as “the delusion of grandeur.”

Or, what is much more common than any of the reactions to the fundamental article of faith described above, a man might feel that God had commissioned him to make known God’s justice and love; had called him to endure the utmost of sacrifice for its wide

proclamation and successful application; had demanded that he incarnate the divine nature in his own life as the only effective means of its revelation to men. And when the people do not respond, being concerned in making practical adjustments to life and not in following abstractions, the prophet again might be thrown back upon himself, conclude that he is much abused and develop a marked persecution complex. He may not realize that his essential message is absurd: that men are naturally wicked and so need to turn to his God for salvation; for if they were, then they could not turn; and if God must be depended upon for the initial revolution, then it would be impious for the sinner to do anything about it himself. All of the emotional appeals which the prophet addresses to his audience, having small effect there and having no foundation in a reasoned view of the world, must react upon himself, mightily stirring up the foundations of his nature (ancestral and primitive as well as personal) till there is left nothing assured in his whole being. At length, if utterly sincere, he must become sadly baffled at the world, secretly wonder about the validity of his message (a question which he dare not frankly face), give himself up to mystic visions, and increasingly separate himself from the calm confidence of normal human living.

While I have been writing the past paragraphs, I have been seeing the kettle bubble—the kettle of my readers' impatience. I suppose that they all are eager to exclaim as with one voice: "But the psychological effects of a belief in God may be very different from those which you have so far described." And to this objection I wish to yield immediate assent. Thus the person overwhelmed with a sense of the injustice of life, its constant thwarting of purpose, might find in God a refuge and a fulfillment—perfect and complete, which the world cannot give. The inscrutability of God's providence would relieve him from all sense of sinfulness in the event of misfortune, and God's justice and mercy ever find new fulfillment in the repeated sanctification of sorrow which comes from personal communion with Him. Fortified by such a faith a man might pass through life with no smell of fire upon his garments, and through the waters of death without fear. But we must insist that to achieve this end such a person would have at every point to make arbitrary selections, carried out to just the right degree, of the intellectual possibilities contained in his faith in God.

And, in like manner, the person whose cup had been filled with success might find in the doctrine of the divine inscrutability a rebuke to all his pride, and in God's justice and love an urgent command to social service—in ways immediately practical and successful. Such deductions are possible but not necessary. The primal doctrine of religious faith may lead the believer to increasing integration or to destruction. One deduction is as logical as another. Acceptance of a doctrine does not guarantee any predictable result in life. Hence the strife of tongues about religious doctrines and their fruitage in practice.

Even when the extremely unfortunate results from a bad choice of inferences from a theistic faith, such as I have described, do not follow, yet many twists, strains and dogmatisms of character do result. Often with vast effort from other parts of one's creed or from a common sense reaction to life, they are pressed far down into consciousness or disguised. But even when they are so dealt with, though no longer recognized for what they are, they profoundly interfere with practical efficiency and with one's essential peace as a loving child of the living God and a simple friend and brother to all the sons of men.

All of this, naturally enough, religious people have repeatedly acknowledged. They have realized that their doctrines do not work *ex opere operato*. At times, in various phrases, they have insisted that the letter is dead, that the spirit alone gives life. Jesus declared that in order to behold his kingdom one must be born again. In other words, the acceptance of no doctrine is in itself sufficient for salvation. Paul declared "we are fools (*i.e.* reject logical reasoning from a single aspect of doctrine) for Christ's sake." And yet, when the attempt is made to bring to a troubled human soul the integrating power of religion, necessarily it finds expression in credal articles such as the one which we have discussed,—articles which may have diametrically opposite effects upon different people. We must therefore conclude that no general statement can be made with regard to the practical effect in life of any specific article of religious faith.

What should we conclude in the face of the facts at which we have so far arrived, namely:—(1) that psycho-analysis cannot disprove the truth of religion but must leave it embedded in the very constitution of our natures, and (2) that no estimate can be made of the value for life of belief in any specific religious doctrine? We

must conclude, in the first place, that whenever a person makes a deduction from his creed which is harming his life, he should be analyzed by a psychiatrist to find the reason for his deduction and then be reeducated to see the other possibilities implied in his creed. And, in the second place, the hydra-headed nature of religious doctrines should be freely admitted by the devout at all times. They should insist that true doctrine must be complex because life is complex. That it may not be purely rational because life is not thus rational.

Life is not a rigid following of any abstract truth however august. Life is a problem in adjustment. And by adjustment I do not mean an oily conformity. I mean something too complex to permit of consistent definition. I mean an unwillingness to misstate facts, yet a willingness to live pleasantly with those who deny the facts. I mean a willingness to sacrifice much for the public good, yet not more than it can profit by and than one can offer without growing bitter at its ingratitude. I mean conformity when no essential issue is involved, while reformation is gathering from the four winds of heaven. I mean purposive endeavor, but also appreciation of the plans of others. If the good life is as complex as this, then so must true doctrine be. And we should be intolerant only of such doctrines as shut out at the final Kingdom of the Spirit any who have gained peace and triumph through a different ordering than our own of the tiles of the fair mosaics of their lives.

The only use to which an article of religion may rightly be put is the employment of its various aspects in correct proportion to right the floundering boat of a human life and bring it to its desired haven—in company with a vast flotilla, which no man can number. Any attempt to render any doctrine absolute, that is, as always pertinent in everyone of its aspects to every life, would cause religion to be of inestimable harm in the lives of those who chance upon an aspect toward which they already lean to heavily. They would be confirmed in error to their final destruction. Man was not made to be offered up as a victim upon the altar fires of an abstract religion; but religion was made for man, for his redemption, both now and unto all the ages.

So conceived, religion is in no conflict with the findings of psychoanalysis. On the contrary, psycho-analysis, by forcing the thought of the Christian church to the question of the effect of doctrines

upon the secret springs of human conduct, has forced religion to turn from a weary round of abstract debates, necessarily unending, to face what is evidently its essential problem,—but a problem which it has not before dared to face for lo! these many centuries. Having now at length faced its problem, religion will solve it. It will offer each human life what it most desperately needs. It will be as personal as was Jesus in its dealing with men—and as tender. It will reinforce with its divine sanctions every undeveloped possibility of the human soul, and it will hold within bounds every urgent desire. Religion, liberated at length from its primitive dread of its own credentials, will in the ages which are upon us accomplish all that it has striven—but not according to knowledge—to do in ages past. First philosophy, then natural science, then historical criticism, and now in these latter days, psychoanalysis, have harrowed the soil of religion. Ever planted with the new life of the rising generations, it will bring forth harvests which will appear of supernal beauty to the contemplative mind.

CHINESE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY*

BY H. G. CREEL

THIS chapter completes the first section of our study, which consists of a sketch of the background against which any intelligible picture of the development of the Chinese world-view must be thrown. We have reviewed, in the briefest way, what seem to have been the very early religious and philosophical ideas of the Chinese. We must now consider the broad conceptual outlines of Chinese thought, as it existed down to the end of our period, *i.e.*, to the first century A. D.

In presenting the varied materials with which we are dealing it is quite impossible to maintain a thoroughly logical order. It has seemed wisest to relinquish chronological sequence in favor of an arrangement which, it is hoped, causes that which precedes to help in the understanding of that which follows.

In undertaking to deal with Chinese natural philosophy we must bear well in mind the cautions of Chapter I. We must look at these Chinese ideas, not through Western eyes, but, in so far as it is at all possible, through Chinese eyes. We must try, then, first of all, to understand what this natural philosophy was to its Chinese authors.

We will not be dismayed by the fact that many Occidental philosophers, particularly certain of the German thinkers, would immediately rule this thinking out of court as no philosophy at all. For they refuse to recognize as philosophers any who do not use a great deal of their intellectual energy in grappling with the epistemological problem. But, as Prof. T. V. Smith has pointed out, the rise of idea-isms and of idealisms is usually associated with the desire to negate the world as it apparently is, in order to escape to a world

* This is one of a series of articles which will be incorporated in a forthcoming book, entitled *Sinism: A Study of the Evolution of the Chinese World-view*.

more flexible to human wishes—that it is, in other words, closely associated with a despair of attaining the good life here and now. But the ancient Chinese were peculiarly fortunately situated, and held steadfastly to the belief that it was possible to make this life, in this world, worth-while. Only the philosophic Taoists abandoned this position even to a degree, and it is precisely their philosophy which most reminds us of Western Idealism. It is surely no accident that in China, most favorable of lands for human life in ancient times, and in the United States, most prosperous of modern nations, similar types of pragmatic philosophy have been developed,⁴¹ and that the latter have effected similarities even in such an element of culture as art.

The Chinese mind is primarily social. The true Chinese cosmos is, monotheistic propaganda of Christian missionaries to the contrary notwithstanding, anthropocentric, never theocentric. The corollary of this is that practical orientation of the Chinese mind which observers have so universally remarked. When the Chinese speculates, he is usually speculating for a purpose, and if he is not, his speculation will be disapproved by Chinese society.

To those of us who deplore the great apparent waste involved in the vast amount of often seemingly foolish speculation in which Western philosophers engage, this may seem a very desirable situation, yet it had its unfortunate results. Without this *narrow* practicality, this short-sighted and imperfect pragmatism, nothing could have prevented the rise of the scientific method in China by the beginning of the Christian era at the latest. Chinese thinkers were penetrating analysts, and they reasoned, in many cases, scientifically. Even experimentation was begun, among certain of the Taoist alchemists, with minerals, vegetables, and even animals, but this was forbidden by their brethren and even by the government, because they were wasting their time!⁴²

This should not be mistaken to mean that the Chinese were wholly ignorant of all but immediately practical matters. Curiosity is, seemingly, a universal characteristic of humanity, and Chinese literature shocks us periodically with bits of surprisingly accurate physical information which the Chinese possessed. For instance, Wang tells us that "Some people have measured the light of the

⁴¹ The fact that Chinese thought is so congenial to our own leads to the reasonable hope that American sinologists may surpass the European in this department of research.

⁴² Leon Wieger, *Taoisme*, Vol. I, p. 14.

sun and calculated his size. They found the diameter to be 1000 *li* (the *li* is about one-third of a mile) long." Far as this figure is from the one which we accept, it is still further removed from the appearance of the sun's size to the naked eye. These ancient Chinese were not inept at getting information they wanted, but on the whole they did lack scientific curiosity. On a point so easy to verify as the manner of the birth of the young of the hare, Wang Ch'ung tells us that they issue from the mouth of the mother! (I, 319).

The crux of the matter is that the ancient Chinese were on the whole neither systematic nor orderly thinkers. When a piece of information suggested itself as true, the only tests which seem to have been applied to it were (1) whether it *appeared* to have practical value, and (2) whether it obviously and flagrantly denied some particularly sacrosanct tenet already accepted as true. If the candidate for inclusion in truth could answer the first question affirmatively and the second question negatively, it became part of the body of things accepted as true. That great lacunae, and numerous mutual contradictions, must have grown up by the use of such methods, appears at once. They did, but because the Chinese did not try very thoroughly to systematize their information, they were unnoticed. The fact that we find Chinese philosophical information done up in neat bundles of five and seven and six factors, etc., does not modify the statement that the ancient Chinese were unsystematic. They were indefatigable cataloguers; they were not systematisers.

Coupled with this practical emphasis, as a leading principle of Chinese natural philosophy, is the fact that the Chinese physical world is a world of action as opposed both to a static world and to a world of substance. On the one hand, the Chinese world appears to be always in flux, to do little resting on any "eternal verities." On the other hand, we find, in the Chinese world, only one sort of substance, if indeed that be a substance at all. (This is a broad generalization, and such statements may usually be shown to have exceptions. There may well be individual variations from this position, although the writer knows of none.) Things are differentiated, not by the stuff of which they are composed, but by the way in which they act. Stuffs pass from a state of having one sort of properties to a state of having another: in the latter state they have a different name, but the only difference is one of activity. One wonders, indeed, whether (although an ancient Chinese would

never have thought of, let alone expressed this) the phenomenon is not, in ancient Chinese thought, identical with the noumenon. To say the same thing otherwise, the Chinese seem to have lacked a conception of substance, matter, as such,⁴³ since this can only exist as over against that which is not material. To the ancient Chinese thinker, the differences between things consist in degree of density (itself a kind of activity) and nature of activity.

So much for the approach of the Chinese thinker to his task. He is practical, unsystematic, looking in the main for ways to better human social life. He is not wedded to a dualistic view of reality⁴⁴ but is, on the whole, a naive realist. But a philosophy, as everyone knows, grows out of another ingredient in addition to methodology, i.e., assumption, the back-ground of axiomatic "truth" which the thinker brings, consciously or unconsciously, to every problem. This background seems very evidently to come from precisely that ancient agricultural-village-life complex which was described in Chapter I.

It will be recalled that the chief characteristics of this life were found to be regularity and order, both in social life and in the natural processes of agriculture and the weather. The hypothesis was further ventured that these two sorts of regularity were amalgamated into a cosmology in which the idea of harmony became the ideal. Granet⁴⁵ calls the Chinese "des gens dont la pensée profonde était que rien de ce qui est humain ne peut être sans retentissement dans la nature entière." In theory, at least this formula works also in the reverse direction. Further, "Le sentiment que le monde naturel et la société humaine sont étroitement solidaires a été l'élément de fond de toutes les croyances chinoises."⁴⁶ The statement is an extreme one, but in the large, true. Surely no one can read the *Chinese Classics*, not to mention other literature, without being impressed with the emphasis which is laid on the dogma that there is a right and proper way to do everything, and that no act is of so little importance that the manner of its doing is a matter of indiffer-

⁴³ Is not modern physical science moving in much the same direction?

⁴⁴ Many, perhaps most, of the writers on Chinese philosophy have called the *yang-yin* idea a dualism. But if it is so, it is a very different sort of dualism from that of the West, since the *yang* and the *yin* are constantly passing over into each other, and both derive from what Wang Ch'ung calls "one primal fluid" 一元氣

⁴⁵ *Religion*, p. 31.

⁴⁶ Granet, *Religion*, p. 17.

ence. This would obviously be true in a universe so constituted that every portion of it were in the most intimate and immediate relations of cause and effect with every other portion of it.

To be sure, the actions of a king or a feudal lord or a sorcerer are of more importance than the same actions on the part of a husbandman, because the former are placed nearer the center of things. The principle is the same as that by which the deflection of the barrel of a rifle, for a fraction of an inch, is much more important near the breach than at the muzzle. The king is at the center (geographically as well as governmentally) of the world, and it is through him that the social world receives its most beneficial integration with the rest of the cosmos. Therefore, if anything goes wrong at the center of things, if the king is not virtuous, the world of men and of animals is disturbed, and various disorders occur in the natural world and in the heavens. This idea is central to Chinese thought, and is perhaps older than any of our literature. It appears in the *Great Plan*,⁴⁷ which is supposed to go back to high antiquity, and to have been written down at the beginning of the Chow dynasty (1024? B. C.).

Fifth, of the royal perfection.—The sovereign having established his highest point of excellence, he concentrates in himself the five happinesses, and then diffuses them so as to give them to his people:— then on their part the multitudes of the people, resting on your perfection, will give you the preservation of it. That the multitudes of the people have no lawless confederacies, and that men *in office* have no selfish combinations, will be an effect of the sovereign's establishing his highest point of excellence.

As will be shown in Chapter III, one inevitable result of this idea was the very rigorous regulation exercised (always in theory and often in practise) over even the most seemingly unimportant acts, performed by persons of significance.

A taste of the intricate symbolism, by which the conceived linkage of the various elements of the universe was represented, is given by the following:

Le Ciel exerce son action bienfaisant à l'aide des douze mois et des cinq Éléments: la musique excite la joie, l'allègresse et produit la concorde au moyen des douze tubes sonores et des cinq notes fondamentales. Chaque tube ex-

⁴⁷ Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Vol. III, p. 328.

prime la Nature d'un mois, chaque note a la Vertu d'un saison.⁴⁸

The connection of the idea of harmony with music⁴⁹ was not overlooked by the Chinese, and we find many references to music as being peculiarly potent, sometimes for evil as well as for good.⁵⁰

We have said that the ideal is harmony. But what is harmony? Here is one of the crucial questions for ancient Chinese philosophy, and one on which various schools differ, as we shall see. But, in general, harmony is the ordinary, the usual, the "golden mean," the temperate, even the common-place.

Generous wine (a good thing in moderation) is a poison; one can not drink much of it. The secretion of bees becomes honey; one can not eat much of it. A hero conquers an entire State, but it is better to keep aloof from him. Pretty women delight the eyes, but it is dangerous to keep them. Sophists are interesting, but they can by no means be trusted. Nice tastes spoil the stomach, and pretty looks beguile the heart. Heroes cause disasters, and controversialists do great harm. These four classes are the poison of society. (I, 303.)

Is this not a beautiful example of the philosophy of the typical western rustic? These things look very nicely, but, better let them alone! Yet Wang Ch'ung, who wrote this, was one of the most sophisticated philosophers China has ever produced. When China became an empire, the Chinese village concept was distended to cover hundreds of thousands of square miles.

The concept of harmony is hypostasized as *h'u ch'i* 和氣, "the harmonious fluid," to which Wang refers often. Unusual phenomena which are considered especially good, as, for instance, the birth of sages (I, 316) are referred to the action of this harmonious fluid.⁵¹

It should be noted that this *h'u ch'i* is not a different kind of fluid, but simply a portion of the universally present fluid which has taken on, for the time being, an unusual mode of action. This ephemeral nature of the superusual quality is graphically shown by the fact that if, for instance, the seed from an unusual sort of

⁴⁸ Granet, *Religion*, p. 120.

⁴⁹ This does not mean that there was "harmony" in the technical musical sense in ancient Chinese music. But even music which consists of single notes must have a certain harmony between those which succeed each other.

⁵⁰ Cf. *Lun Hêng*, II, 180; Granet, *Religion* p. 119-121.

⁵¹ Cf. also I, 471.

grain (the spontaneous growth of which is a good omen) be sown, the crop will be only ordinary grain, the harmonious fluid which produced the original grain having dissipated (I, 356-7). Wang denies even that there is a species of the fabled unicorn, holding that it is probably born in the deer species under unusual conditions. (I, 357). Specifically: "All ominous 瑞 things originate from a harmonious fluid. "Born in an ordinary species, they have their peculiar character, and therefore become omens." (I, 356.)

It is difficult, however, to distinguish this harmonious fluid² from the *chao* (or *yao*) 妖 fluid. The latter adjective has the force of "weird" or "supernatural."

The *chao* fluid engenders beauty, but the beautiful are often vicious and depraved. The mother of Shu Hu was a beauty. Shu Hsiang's mother knew her, and would not allow her to go to the chamber of her husband. Shu Hsiang remonstrated. "In the depths of the mountains and in vast marshes dragons and snakes really grow," said his mother. "She is beautiful, but I am afraid, lest she give birth to a dragon or a snake, which would bring mishap upon you." (I, 302.)

That is, unusual beings, since they are formed of the same stuff (*i.e.*, the original universal stuff *plus* superusual action-patterns) may and often do change from one into another form of such beings with the greatest ease.

But what is the difference between these two classes of unusual stuff, the harmonious and the weird? Two distinctions may be inferred from Wang's treatment. With respect to origin, the harmonious fluid seems to be generated by an especially harmonious condition, social or cosmic, such as prevails in time of peace or at the equinoxes; the origin of the *chao* fluid is more special and accidental. With respect to result, the harmonious fluid is in general beneficent, while the weird fluid may produce either good or bad effects. These distinctions are not rigorous, however, as we should not expect them to be. In general, the ideal is that of symmetry, a specialization of the harmonious principle which holds that like must be grouped with like. It is therefore the case that the same stuff may be beneficial to one man, who has the constitution to consort with it, and deadly to another.

² As here used the word *fluid* is not easy to distinguish in meaning from mere *substance*.

When the Hsia emperor K'ung Chia was hunting on Mount Shou it began to rain, the sky turned dark, and he entered the house of a citizen, where the mistress was just nursing a baby. Some said the child to which an emperor came must needs rise to high honors, but others were of the opinion that a child unfit for such an honor would become ill-fated. (II, 314.)

The child turned out unlucky.⁵³

Again, if two individuals of different constitution, one fated, perhaps, for the nobility, the other for common life, are so unlucky as to marry, the match is very unfortunate, for one of them must die.

It becomes apparent that this matter of harmony and disharmony was not an academic philosophical question, but one of the greatest practical importance. In such a world, if one is to live satisfactorily, he must know, in the first place, what constitutes harmony. How may it be preserved, or, if lost, how may it be regained? These questions of technique and of the fundamental standard of harmony are at the base of the more important philosophical and religious systems developed in China. They must be dealt with in the chapters which remain. Before that, however, there is still something to be sketched of the fundamental background of the whole intellectual drift.

It is evident that in any case "harmony" denotes a relationship between two or more objects. A "harmonious" universe must be a universe in which parts are distinguishable, in order that those parts may stand against each other in that *relation* which alone can give meaning to the term "harmonious." Furthermore, any attempt to produce or to conserve a condition of harmony must have as its end the control of these parts. It is, then, one would suppose, perfectly evident that the investigation of the divisions of Existence (*i.e.*, the universe), of the characteristics of these parts, and of their mutual relationships and tendencies to act, is not only of philosophical and speculative interest, but is (on the premises) a *prerequisite* to practical action, and therefore to be considered as the most practical sort of activity.⁵⁴

⁵³ This idea differs from the Polynesian idea of the hurt done a commoner by the chief's *mana*, because the conception of kingship is different, as will be shown in the next chapter.

⁵⁴ I do not mean to intimate that the physical theories which will be described were all reached as the result of such a process of reasoning as is here given. I do mean, however, to protest against the custom of some writers in the field, to consider Chinese physical theory as utterly impractical and puerile speculation. It has already been shown that Chinese thought was, on the whole, too practical to be so fruitful as it might otherwise well have been.

The Chinese thinkers did not, of course, elaborate the constitution of the universe *de novo*, but rather reworked the old conceptual furniture into useable forms. The first, and perhaps in all Chinese thought the most important divisions which were made, seem to have been the old categories of *yang* and *yin*. The early history of these ideas has been traced. They quickly expanded, in importance, far beyond their vague beginnings.

As well as an historical beginning (which, of course, the Chinese philosopher did not recognize), it was thought in the philosophical era that the *yang* and the *yin* must have had a material origin, and this was almost universally referred to some single original stuff out of which the two were differentiated.

Wang says specifically that "One Heaven (which is *yang*) and one Earth (which is *yin*) conjointly produce all things. When they are created they all receive the same fluid." (I, 471.) But why is there evil in some, why are there such creatures as vipers, etc.?

Fire is a phenomenon of the sun. All created beings of the world are filled with the solar fluid (or, the fluid of too much *yang*),⁵⁵ and after their creation contain some poison [i.e., poison is excessive *yang*, cf. I, 298]. Reptiles and insects possessing this poison in abundance become vipers and adders, bees and scorpions, plants become croton seeds and wild dolichos, fishes become porpoises and *to-shu* fish. Consequently men eating a porpoise liver die, and the bite of a *to-shu* is venomous. . . .

Among mankind bad characters take the place of these creatures. Their mouths do mischief.⁵⁶ The bad men of the world are imbued with poison fluid. The poison of the wicked living in the land of *yang*⁵⁷ is still more virulent, hence the curses and the swearing of the people of south-ern Yüeh have such wonderful results.

Here we see that the *yang* and the *yin* have become, not mere principles of classification, but also principles of origination of all things, and principles, also, of their difference.

⁵⁵ *T'ai yang* 太陽 may mean either "the Great Yang" (i.e., the sun) or it may mean "too much (i.e., excessive) *yang*." Forke translates it always in the former sense, which, while technically correct, does not always present the best sense of the passage to the reader. As a matter of fact, the ideas are identical in Wang's thinking, for he says specifically "The sun is fire" (I, 301) and fire is the very essence of *yang*.

⁵⁶ The mouth and tongue, as well as speech, are *yang*. (I, 246. 301).

⁵⁷ The south (I, 298).

It is pertinent to ask, at this point, when these all-pervasive concepts first appear in Chinese literature. Wieger places the earliest possible occurrence of the terms in recorded literature at the time of Confucius.⁵⁸ The *Yi King* has been supposed to contain them in other language and in veiled references. Forke says, rightly, that to find them there requires very liberal interpretation. On the other hand, it seems likely that the ideas did exist in some form at a time much earlier than that of Confucius. Let us consult a thoroughly unbiased source for the meaning of the terms. The following definitions are from Mr. O. Z. Tsang's *Complete Chinese-English Dictionary*.

Yang. (n.) The male or positive principle in nature. The sun. The south of a hill. The north of a river. Penis. (adj.) Male; masculine. Sunny; light; brilliant. *Yin.* (n.) A shadow; shade. The south side of a river. The female or negative principle in nature. The privates; privities; the genitals. (adj.) Shady; dark; cloudy; gloomy. Cold. Mysterious; secret. Female; feminine.

Why do we find in these definitions this irrelevant "south of a hill," "south of a river," etc.? These do not appear to be the deliberate constructions of philosophic terminologists. Granet holds that these refer to the relative positions taken by the young men and the girls in the spring festivals previously referred to, which, he thinks, did much to give content to the *yin* and *yang* idea.⁵⁹ The hypothesis seems probable.

There is a difficulty, however, in the apparent non-occurrence of the words, if not of the ideas, in the early literature. The characters occur frequently in the *Shu* and the *Shi*, but are used in senses other than the philosophical. In the *Shu* there seems to be only one certain reference to the *yin* and the *yang* as philosophical concepts.⁶⁰

The particular document in which the passage occurs is said to date from about 1000 B.C. It is possible, also, that the very beginning of *The Great Plan* employs the *yin-yang* idea, in this case substituting *T'ien* for *yang*. No published translation which I have examined gives this meaning to the passage, however.

As a final statement, it may be said that the origin of the *yang* and *yin* ideas is not possible at present to determine positively. They

⁵⁸ *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 136.

⁵⁹ *Religion*, p. 21.

⁶⁰ *Shu*, p. 527.

do not appear, however, to be mere constructions of sophisticated philosophers, and there is reason to believe that they go back to early roots in Chinese folk religion.

It is obviously a simple and inevitable step to identify that regularity and harmony, cosmic and social, of which we have spoken, with the harmony of the *yin* and the *yang*.

The people being at ease, the *yin* and the *yang* are in harmony, and when they harmonize, all things grow and develop; such being the case, strange omens come forth. (II, 192.)

When the *yin* and the *yang* are at variance, calamitous changes supervene. (II, 16.)

The connection between *yin* and winter, *yang* and summer, was mentioned in Chapter I. This later received a philosophical interpretation. "The *yang* having reached its climax turns into *yin*, and the *yin* having gone to extremes becomes *yang*." (II, 344.) Again there should be noted the tendency of all things to preserve harmony, or at least to tend to and return to it. Animals are classified, in general, as *yang* and *yin*, showing themselves in summer or in winter (II, 357). The bear is, of course, a *yang* animal.⁶¹

Here we have the beginning of that elaborate classification of objects and phenomena as belonging to the *yin* or to the *yang* which pervades so much of ancient Chinese literature. The brightness and obscurity of the two fluids explains the difference in the length of days in summer and in winter (I, 258). An eclipse is the temporary vanquishment of the *yang* by the *yin* (I, 269), or of the sun by the moon (which is *yin*) (I, 270). The sun is proved to be fire by the fact that a burning-glass held toward the sun will cause flame (II, 350-51, 412); similarly, mirrors left out at night accumulate dew, which is water drawn from the moon (water is the *yin* "element," and the moon is *yin*) (II, 351). Ghosts are made of concentrated *yang*, and therefore are, of course, the *yang* color, red.⁶² They are able to hurt people because *yang* is poison (I, 299).⁶³

⁶¹ Granet, *Dances*, p. 567.

⁶² Wang does not believe that ghosts are dead men, but those who do, in China, sometimes hold that since man is made up of *yang* and of *yin*, and decomposes when he dies, the lighter stuff, *i.e.*, the *yang*, is naturally what will go about hurting people. Ghosts made of *yin* are not unknown, however.

⁶³ The idea of *yang* as poison would appear not only to be connected with the fact that it is essential activity, and is unharmonious without the mixture of *yin*, but also with the prevalence of disease and fever in summer and in hot regions.

In Kiang-pei the land is dry; consequently bees and scorpions abound there.⁶⁴ . . . Those creatures growing in high and dry places are like the *yang* (the male principle). The *yang* (penis) hangs down, therefore bees and scorpions sting with their tails (I, 302).

The *yin* occupies a less prominent place in this process of classification, as is fitting. "The creatures living in low and wet places resemble the female principle. The female organ is soft and extensible, therefore snakes bite with their mouths" (I, 302). The dragon, an animal associated with clouds and rain, belongs to the *yin*.

A proverb says "Many mouths melt metal."⁶⁵

The mouth is fire. Fire is the second of the five elements, and speech the second of the five actions. There is an exact correspondence between speech and fire, therefore in speaking of the melting of metal one says that the mouth and tongue melt it.

This brings us to the classification by fives, which is an important and complicated subject. The use of the number five may be traced, perhaps, to counting on the fingers. In any case, any reader of the *Chinese Classics* alone can not fail to note the predominance of the classification into fives.

In the *Great Plan*, of the *Shu King*, the antiquity of which has already been discussed, there are several sets of fives, conspicuously more than of any other number. The five we may accept as old. But which five is oldest, and started the system? Provisionally, in the present lack of evidence, there is good reason to believe that the five directions, north, south, east, west, and center, may well have come first. There is nothing inherently sophisticated in the idea, the Zuni Indians of North America having had as many as seven directions. It is an idea which might easily occur from the east-west passage of the sun, to which a perpendicular is easily erected. The idea of the center, tied to the idea of the village and of the mound (*shê*), seems a natural addition.⁶⁶

Chinese geography represented the world as very much like an apple pie, cut into quarters, with a slice for each cardinal direction. This means that the lines of division ran northeast-southwest and

⁶⁴ Denoting *yang*, since water is *yin*.

⁶⁵ This may have arisen from the process of blowing the flame of the blast furnace.

⁶⁶ Does the fact that there was not an *up* direction, but that there was a *center* associated with the *shê* argue that the *shê* is older than *T'ien*?

northwest-southeast. Heaven was a similar pie, according to one idea, situated a great distance above the earth. The center of heaven was the pole star, while the center of the earth was the imperial *shê*. Whether there were other worlds was debated. (I, 89).⁶⁷

Le trait fondamental de la pensée chinoise est une classification des êtres par Régions, sous la domination d'un Vent ou d'un Orient.⁶⁸

That the five directions was the first system of the hierarchy of fives to be developed, seems altogether probable, if not provable. But what came next? Probably the five colors and the five *hsing*, but which of these preceded would be difficult to say.

The five colors are not difficult to account for. For north and south we have simply the colors of the *yin* and the *yang*, black and red. Red is the color of the sun and of flame. Black is the color of night, and of darkness and shade in general.

The color of east is green. The sun rises in the east, which governs Spring (I, 520) and the new life. The color most prominent in Spring is, of course, green. The color of the center, always associated with earth, is yellow, which is perfectly understandable if we remember the color of the loess which makes up the soil of much of China.

Only the color of the west, white, is difficult to account for. It may well have come, however, as an attempt to complete the list of colors. It is the only color conspicuously missing from the list previously given.⁶⁹

Concerning the antiquity of the five colors, it is worthy of note that they are mentioned in *The Tribute of Yu*, which Legge suggests may have been written during the Hsia time, and feels rather certain was in existence before 1077 B.C.⁷⁰

Given the five directions and the five colors, the evolution of the so-called Five Elements, the *wu hsing* already referred to, would seem to present no great difficulty. *A priori*, there does not seem to be any great necessity of postulating a foreign origin, as some scholars have done.

⁶⁷ It must not be supposed that sophisticated Chinese thought, even in *Wang's* time, held such a simple idea of the heavens. Complicated theories which accounted very ingeniously for the movements of the heavenly bodies had been developed. (Cf. I, 260-61).

⁶⁸ Granet, *Danses*, p. 390.

⁶⁹ Green is a very usual substitute for blue in the making of color series.

⁷⁰ *Shu King* in *S. B. E.*, p. 19 (cf. p. 67).

The five *hsing* are, in the order of their "production," wood, fire, earth, metal, water.⁷¹ This is the order in which, starting in the east with wood, they would occur, clockwise, as one passed around a map, omitting earth which is the center. It is also the order in which occur, beginning again with wood (corresponding to Spring), the seasons with which these elements are associated, again omitting the earth. They are said to "produce" each other in this order. Wood produces (is capable of supporting) fire; fire produces earth (ashes); earth produces metal; metal produces water (dew deposited on a metal mirror); water produces (makes possible the growth of) wood. Thus the circle is completed.⁷²

Another order in which the *hsing* figure prominently in Chinese thought is that in which they "overcome" each other. This order is water, fire, metal, wood, earth, and may be seen to be based on the north-south, west-east opposition. Water extinguishes fire, fire melts metal, metal cuts wood, wood penetrates earth (by the roots of trees, or, perhaps by the wooden plow), earth soaks up or dams the course of water.⁷³

As opposed to such attempts at explaining these sequences on a naïve and quasi-naturalistic basis, Granet⁷⁴ holds that they are:

Simplement une transposition dans l'ordre intellectuel de divers modes de la technique divinatoire. . . .

This is possible, and in the existence of good evidence might even be probable, but he admits that

Nous ne savons pas de quelle façon les techniques divinatoires, astrologiques, et astronomiques ont commandé le développement de ces théories.

An hypothesis so feebly supported remains an hypothesis. Naturalistic origin appears most probable.

When and where did the five elements originate? Chavannes has held that they were introduced to the Chinese, from a "barbarian" people, about 300 B.C.⁷⁵ If true, this would necessitate great revision in the writing of Chinese history. It has, however, been refuted thoroughly both by De Saussure and by Forke.⁷⁶ As De

⁷¹ It will be remembered that these are "forces," not inert "elements," and they must not be confused with those "materialistic" concepts which are opposed, in the West, to "spiritual things."

⁷² Cf. Forke, *Lun Hêng*, Vol. II, p. 469-70.

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.* Vol. II, p. 470-71.

⁷⁴ *Religion*, p. 117-118.

⁷⁵ *T'oung Pao*, 1906, p. 96-97.

⁷⁶ *T'oung Pao*, 1910, p. 265 f. *Lun Hêng*, Vol. II, p. 240.

Saussure has said, all of the ancient literature of China "est partout (let us be cautious and qualify with "almost") imprégnée de la théorie des cinq éléments."

The five *hsing* are given in the *Great Plan*.

First, of the five elements.—The first is named water; the second, fire; the third, wood; the fourth, metal; the fifth, earth. *The nature of* water is to soak and descend; of wood, to be crooked and straight; of metal, to obey and to change; while the virtue of earth is seen in seed-sowing and ingathering. That which soaks and descends becomes salt; that which blazes and ascends becomes bitter; that which is crooked and straight becomes sour; that which obeys and changes becomes acrid; and from seed-sowing and ingathering comes sweetness.⁷⁷

Here we have an example of that building of fives, to correspond with the five *hsing*, directions, seasons, etc., which ancient Chinese writers were wont to indulge in. Even in the above quotation, it will be seen that the principle of, at least, easily available analogy, was abandoned. Beyond doubt, there was a reason for each of these lists, and its order, but many of these reasons must have been historical rather than analogical. That we shall ever be able to explain the origin of all of them seems both doubtful and of little import. A table of these fives is given on the next page. It must be remembered that this table is suggestive rather than exhaustive. There are, for instance, within the brief space of the *Great Plan*, tables of fives which it does not include. Further, there is more than one set of animals which is placed in relation to the five *hsing* (cf. I, 105).

It is true, as was said in the beginning of this chapter, that these various lists of phenomena were not systematised, in the sense of a rigid revision to remove discrepancies.

There was, however, a distinct but perhaps almost an unconscious process of reducing ancient, and perhaps intruded, elements of thought to the terms of the *yang-yin*, five *hsing* interpretation of the universe. We have seen, for instance, that the *shê*, the village mound, apparently gave three elements to this complex which were not a part of the old cult of the *shê* at all, that is, the idea of *yin* as localized particularly in earth, the idea of the center direction, and the idea of earth as one of the *hsing* and associated with the *yin* and the center. Again, Wang mentions the Four Sacred Mountains

⁷⁷Shu, (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 326-27.

Table of the Five "Elements" 五行 and Their Correlates.*

Five "Elements"	wood	fire	earth	metal	water
Five Directions	east	south	center	west	north
Five Colors	green	red	yellow	white	black
Four Seasons	spring	summer		autumn	winter
Five Flavors	sour	bitter	sweet	acid	salt
Five Odors	goatish	burning	fragrant	rank	rotten
Five Grains	wheat	beans	panicked millet	hemp	millet
Five Sacrifices	inner door	hearth	inner court (atrium)	outer door	well
Five Animals	sheep	fowl	ox	dog	pig
Five Classes of Creatures	scaly	feathered	naked	hairy	shell-covered
Five Organs	spleen	lungs	heart	liver	kidneys
Five Numbers	8	7	5	9	6
Five Musical Notes	<i>chio</i>	<i>chih</i>	<i>kung</i>	<i>shang</i>	<i>yü</i>

(* This table, based chiefly on the *Li Ki*, is suggestive rather than exhaustive. Many variations from the above lists occur, and many sets of "fives" not mentioned here are to be found in Chinese literature.)

(II, 244). There can be no doubt that the mountain was one of the important objects of early Chinese religion, and it may well have served as the gathering place for feudal lords which it is represented. We find, however, that the sacred mountains become five, each one corresponding to one of the directions.⁷⁸ In another place Wang himself speaks of the Five Mountains (I, 251).

It is not to be supposed that the categories which have been mentioned are the only ones which figure in Chinese thought. Various less important categories, such as that of the "Six Honored Ones" (I, 517),⁷⁹ are met with, but these seem not to have won any great use, perhaps because they did not fit well with the categories which had already developed into a flourishing complex.

It is altogether possible that the number eight, and the four, are older in Chinese thought than is the five. Certainly eight is an important number throughout the ancient period, but in the literature it is by no means so prominent as the five.

Les Vents sont huit comme les sons. Les danseurs s'affrontent par bandes de huit (on vient de voir qu'il (sic) se groupaient aussi par trois). Les inventeurs des chants et de la danse sont les Huit fils d'un Souverain . . . qui était le mari de Hi-Ho (le Soleil) et de Tch'ang-hi (la Lune). Le soleil parcourt dans sa journée *seize* stations (parmi les noms qui correspond à la première se retrouve les noms d'un luth et celui d'une danse). Pour presider à la nuit, il y a Deux bandes de Huit divinités.⁸⁰

That the four directions and their media gave origin to the number eight seems *a priori* probable. There is some evidence for this.

Les huit sons . . . sont, d'après le *Po hou t'ong* chap. 1, *Houai-nan tseu* et le *Po ya*: le Tambour (peau) = N.; la flute de Pan (alebasse à 19 tuyaux) = N-E.; la flûte (bambou) = E.; la caisse de *bois* = S-E.; l'instrument à cordes de soies = S.; le sifflet d'*argile* = S. W.; la cloche (métal) = W.; la pierre sonore = N-W.⁸¹

Such was the general character of the various ways in which the parts of the world of existence were described in ancient China.

To summarize, we have found the most general conception of

⁷⁸ Henry Doré, *Researches into Chinese Superstitions* (tr. by M. Kennelly), Vol. VIII, p. xxiv.

⁷⁹ According to Forke, these have been said to be "water, fire, wind, thunder, hills, lakes" or, "sun, moon, stars, rivers, seas, and mountains."

⁸⁰ Granet, *Dances*, p. 264.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 264, n. 1.

early Chinese philosophy to be that of harmony and order, in which social and cosmic regularity are combined in a single complex. But this simple whole had to be analyzed, both under the pressure of curiosity, and of necessity to control the environment of man. This analysis, probably never made consciously, followed old lines of thinking, and gave rise to the idea that all things originated from the interaction of the *yang* and the *yin*. These, combined with the simple ideas of direction, and working perhaps under the influence of the decimal numbering system, developed into the complex series of fives. Other methods of analyzing reality arose in profusion, but were never able to reach the supremacy of those already mentioned.

Man occupies an interesting place in this universe. He is, as we have seen, a natural and an inseparable part of it, his acts affecting all the universe, and all the universe affecting him, in a manner much more intimate than the Western world is accustomed to suppose. Yet he is also felt to be unique. Wang says "Man alone is not metamorphosed, being the recipient of the real Heavenly fluid" (I, 327). As is not unusual, Wang contradicts himself on this later; however, he is giving expression to a very deep-seated conviction of the value of man, which is typically Chinese. The *Li Ki* says:

Man is the heart and mind of Heaven and Earth, and the visible embodiment of the five elements. He lives in the enjoyment of all flavors, the discriminating of all notes (of harmony)) and the enrobing of all colors.⁸²

Here is suggested the idea, voiced many times, that man is a microcosm, reflecting the universe. He is certainly in close relation to it.

A great man agrees with Heaven and Earth in virtue (II, 27).

Heaven, in giving birth to the multitudes of the people, to every faculty and relationship annexed its law. The people possess this normal nature. And they (consequently) love its normal virtue.⁸³

But man, an integral part of a supposedly harmonious universe, found that all things were not as they should be, and that famine, war, and injustice made life something far different from that ideal peaceful existence which is so beautifully described in the *Classics*. How was this possible? More important, how could humanity find the way back to order, peace, happiness?

To the various answers which were given to these questions, the remainder of this study will be largely devoted.

⁸² *Li Ki* (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 382.

⁸³ *Shi King* (in *Chinese Classics*) p. 541.

THE IDEA OF PURPOSE

BY CURTIS W. REESE

I

PHILOSOPHY properly understood is perhaps the most important of all studies. It is not, however, to be thought of as a system of a priori hypotheses, but rather the art of thinking in an orderly way and on the basis of factual experience about one's total situation. In recent times the idea has taken hold of many minds that philosophy must give way to the sciences. I regard the growth of the sciences as one of the most encouraging of modern developments; but the basic terms and concepts of the sciences need constant critical scrutiny and the results of scientific inquiry inevitably lead thoughtful persons to wonder what it is all about. The examination of terms and concepts is the critical function of philosophy and the attempt to form opinions about the totality of experience is its speculative function. Without this critical and speculative service of philosophy, the sciences would suffer and life adjustments in a world sometimes all too chaotic become even more difficult than they are at present.

The focussing of attention upon the sciences, and especially of late upon technology has naturally taken attention away from the more far-reaching problems of man's place in the cosmic arrangement. Nevertheless, the "how" of things, which is the particular interest of science, cannot thrive unless someone attends to the "why" of things, which is the particular interest of philosophy. Nor can the "why" be fruitful unless someone attends to the problem of "how" things come about.

So, after all the marvelous progress of modern science, we still find ourselves puzzled more and more over the old philosophical problem of the nature of being, and still wondering whether

in point of fact there is an increasing purpose running through the ages and if so, what it is.

It is no surprise to find this state of uncertainty about things cosmic when one considers the causes that lead to it. First of all there is the appalling state of the human race. Poverty and ignorance and disease and war and the like menace the human family. Ages pass and conditions are changed but little, and then not always for the better. Second, there is the old naturalism which spreads terror. One could fairly hear the scream of the cosmic wheels as they rolled relentlessly through the years, and feel the cold blast of surely enveloping winter as it chilled the soul. And, third, we were taught that the universe itself was running down at a terrific speed. The classic expression illustrative of man's desperate situation is found in Bertrand Russell's *The Free Man's Worship*. Here is another characteristic statement from his pen, as quoted by Hoernle in *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*: "The universe as astronomy reveals it is very vast. How much there may be beyond what our telescopes show, we cannot tell; but what we can know is of unimaginable immensity. In the visible world the Milky Way is a tiny fragment; within this fragment, the solar system is an infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopic dot. On this dot, tiny lumps of impure carbon and water, of complicated structure, with somewhat unusual physical and chemical properties, crawl about for a few years, until they are compounded. They divide their time between labour designed to postpone the moment of dissolution for themselves and frantic struggles to hasten it for others of their kind. Natural convulsions periodically destroy some thousands or millions of them, and disease prematurely sweeps away many more. These events are considered to be misfortunes; but when men succeed in inflicting similar destruction by their own efforts, they rejoice, and give thanks to God. In the life of the solar system, the period during which the existence of man will have been physically possible is a minute portion of the whole; but there is some reason to hope that even before this period is ended man will have set a term to his own existence by his efforts at mutual annihilation. Such is man's life viewed from the outside."

Another classic utterance in similar vein, but with a different purpose in view, is from Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*. He

says, "Man—past, present and future—lays claim to our devotion. What, then, can we say of him? Man, so far as natural science by itself is able to teach us, is no longer the final cause of the universe, the Heaven-descended heir of all the ages. His very existence is an accident, his story a brief and transitory episode in the life of one of the meanest of the planets. Of the combination of causes which first converted a dead organic compound into the living progenitors of humanity, science, indeed, as yet knows nothing. It is enough that from such beginnings famine, disease, and mutual slaughter, fit nurses of the future lords of creation, have gradually evolved, after infinite travail, a race with conscience enough to feel that it is vile, and intelligence enough to know that it is insignificant. We survey the past, and see that its history is of blood and tears, of helpless blundering, of wild revolt, of stupid acquiescence, of empty aspirations. We sound the future, and learn that after a period, long compared with the individual life, but short indeed compared with the divisions of time open to our investigation, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. Imperishable monuments and immortal deeds, death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they had never been. Nor will anything that *is* be better or be worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless generations to effect."

It is not yet possible to feel altogether comfortable about the environing situation, but our fears are a bit assuaged by the increasing testimony of competent thinkers to the effect that while our knowledge of the universe does not allow us to affirm dogmatically that we are the favorites of the cosmos; neither does it allow us to pronounce dogmatically the final doom of all things good and fair. Professor Perry of Harvard, in his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, says, "To pretend to speak for the universe in terms of the narrow and abstract predictions of astronomy, is to betray a bias of mind that is little less provincial and unimaginative than the most naive anthropomorphism. What that residual cosmos which

looms beyond the border of knowledge shall in time bring forth, no man that has yet been born can say. That it may overbalance and remake the little world of things known, and falsify every present prophecy, no man can doubt. It is as consistent with rigorous thought to greet it as a promise of salvation, as to dread it as a portent of doom. And if it be granted that in either case it is a question of over-belief, of the hazard of faith, no devout soul can hesitate."

Professor Lewis of the University of California, in a recent work on *The Anatomy of Science*, testifies that he finds no evidence that the universe is running down; and Professor Millikan believes that he has found positive evidence that the creative process still functions on a cosmic scale. While such testimony is encouraging, especially since the feeling of dependence that most of us have to an alarming degree predisposes us in favor of facts or even theories that increase our confidence in cosmic support, it is nevertheless a long leap from such fragmentary bits of hope to the affirmation of a purposeful universe which concerns itself with human affairs. And I myself am not yet prepared to make it, save as the idea may apply to orderly movement and to the partial achievements of parts.

The idea of purpose carries us beyond peace meal issues to considerations of the whole, so it is fundamentally a religious problem; and for this reason, among others, the warfare of conflicting ideas of purpose has been intense, sometimes bitter. There is a feeling, which I believe to be well grounded, that what one thinks about the problem of purpose really makes a difference in human conduct. The idea of purpose, therefore, should be studied not merely in the light of personal experience, which is oftentimes crude and chaotic, but in the light of highly organized systems of thought as worked out by mature minds. The effect in personal development and social action of theories held on such a subject, in my judgment justifies careful scrutiny of the problem as thought out by various schools.

Moreover, purpose must be interpreted broadly. It is not tied up essentially with any single manner of origin, or mode of realization. Orderly movement is the essential criterion. A machine-like universe moving toward a fixed goal would surely indicate purpose, even though we should never find out what the purpose is. An absolute that eternally reorganized its inner parts would be pur-

positive. And by the same token, a universe with no total goal would be purposive as regards its parts that come to fruition. Should the cosmos end in utter oblivion, it would still be true that the mind of a Plato or of a Francis Bacon resulted from purposive process of whatever origin and however operative. And especially would the result of human wills, or of human wills linked in a common cause fall within the scope of purposive processes. From such broad view as this, and not from a narrow personalistic view, must we approach the subject.

The quest for purpose in the universe has resulted in many theories, some of which we shall now briefly sketch.

1. In the early days of human life it was thought that spiritual beings, both good and bad, inhabited things and influenced or controlled their doings. This animistic, or as it is called—in its earlier form animatistic, view held sway for along into comparatively modern times, and in a modified way still commands the allegiance of many people. Indeed vitalism is animism's sophisticated city cousin. Animism concerns itself not so much with ultimate and far-flung purposes as with immediate ends. There are floating sou's, or souls in general, that enter into relations with things and persons, sometimes briefly, sometimes taking possession for extended periods. All sorts of curious, unusual, or dramatic happenings are accounted for in animism by the purposive operation of spirits that infest the earth. The effort to get rid of evil spirits or to induce good ones to become operative has resulted in the creation of all sorts of ceremonies, many of which continue long after the spirits that they were designed to placate have faded into myths. Other sou's inhere in rivers and seas and mountains, the winds and the heavens above. Sometimes these spirits rise to the position of presiding Gods, thus passing from an animative status to that of a directive spirit. Fauns and the like constitute the souls of plants and trees. The souls of animals are manlike in ideas and mental processes. Man himself in his basic nature is soul, his bodily form being a more or less unnecessary impediment. The whole world is full of purposes and the means for their realization, but the idea of one inclusive or increasing purpose has not yet dawned to trouble the mind of primitive man.

2. Animism, which by reading a part into the whole, levels nature up to man, may be contrasted with materialism, or as it was

known in its lower stages, atomism, which levels man downward and constantly looks with suspicion upon all that is not explainable by the locomotion of materials. This is an ancient notion of the way things operate dating back no doubt far beyond Democritus in whose hands the theory took more or less reputable form. But the atomic theory fared poorly due no doubt to the long alliance of Aristotelian Philosophy with Theology, till in the 17th century it merged into a more general materialism. Regarding the elements not as properties but as bodies, was an effort to find constant qualitative elements, and was a fruitful scientific method. But it was not quite so fruitful in philosophical results. And, unfortunately for materialism, the atom was found to be made up of lesser units of uncertain nature, which behaved in ways not altogether characteristic of material units. So the effort to eliminate purpose from nature, or to reduce it to clocklike motions has resulted in more uncertainty as to what things are composed of and how they operate than ever before in human history. If it be conceded that all is matter, then comes the query, what is matter? And any effort to answer this question requires the use of terms that are suggestive of anything else but a block universe. So the materialistic hypothesis proved to be no more philosophically fit than was animism. Both views are mirrors in which the face of reality is distorted.

3. Perhaps the most ambitious attempts to find a satisfactory explanation of things, and to give man a feeling of cosmic support, fall under the general head of theocracy. True the idea of God or gods did not arise from this or any single motive, the origin of God idea is most complex and is still shadowed in mystery. But perhaps from earliest times, the shorthand explanation of mysterious, or even commonplace occurrences was to credit them to the operation of God or gods. Man sorrowfully faced sure defeat when the gods were against him. He joyfully faced sure victory if they were allied with him. Always, however, there were sophisticated intellects who had their doubts about the adequacy of theocracy. But only the most courageous gave vent to their doubts. What happened was that the gods were gradually reduced in number and their functions quietly reduced in scope. Aristotle's prime mover is a case in point. Another is the whole movement which in its later and more developed form is known as deism. For some purpose as

yet unknown, God started the world going, established laws for its movements and then retired, leaving the vast machine to itself. I think the chief motive in deism is not so much to find what the end is, as to find what the beginning was. Getting things started was the big job, so God was regarded as the great first cause, or the Divine Technician. At best this idea of God was satisfactory only to those persons whose chief interest was speculative. It never warmed the heart to the point of discipleship. It left the world in cold isolation from the hearthstone of the old homestead, in sharp contrast with the brooding will of theism. Little wonder that theologians, with more or less consistency, balanced transcendence with imminence. In this effort to harmonize transcendence and imminence is found the doctrine of theism properly so called.

4. Theism is the hypothesis that the ultimate ground of the universe is intelligent will fulfilling a moral purpose in the course of which he either consciously and specifically influences human fortunes or so orders the cosmic situation as to make possible the realization of moral ends by human beings. This is a very satisfactory view for one who can bring himself to the point of holding it with deep conviction, but it seems to many persons to be inadequate. Romantically viewed, theism has the edge on all other forms of theocracy. But realistically viewed by one who wants to know the truth even though the truth fail to set him free, the theistic hypothesis presents insuperable difficulties. To apply such terms as "moral," "intelligent will," and the like to the ultimate ground of the universe, or to the universe itself, is to take terms that belong to the human realm out of their human setting and apply them to a totality which is non-human though including the human. Moreover, it is noteworthy that only the good qualities of men are read into the ultimate. By the same process that one uses in arriving at a personal God, one might arrive at the idea of a personal devil. Nor are the doings of the cosmos such as to indicate that the term moral has cosmic significance in the sense that it has human significance. The universe seems to be either above or below good and evil. Cosmic forces seem to be irreconcilable with theism. Theoretically, also, the theistic view is unsatisfactory, for the mere purpose of working out a pre-destined end a mechanistic arrangement would seem to be preferable. Such an arrangement would make unnecessary the conscious and specific influence of human

affairs, or even attention to cosmic happenings. It might be said in rebuttal that if the end in view were the production of free human personality, a mechanistic arrangement would not suffice. But in view of the moral waste on every hand, and the present conception of the vastness of the universe with its millions of suns, such concern for human welfare seems highly improbable. Furthermore, the evidence, as evidence is ordinarily understood, for the theistic type of influence of human fortunes is lacking. By the common consent of the competent, the experience of God in the very act of influencing human fortunes is the only valid evidence. Such mystical experiences are exceedingly rare, and such as exist are capable of explanation on grounds other than the theistic, and in any event they could have no primary validity for persons having no such experience. Evidence, to be scientifically valid, must be capable of verification.

For these reasons, the theistic hypothesis seems to me to be an unsatisfactory way of finding purpose in the universe. That theistic theologians are aware of the inadequacy of theism as historically held is evidenced by the fact that many of them are developing variations of the theory that leave the old view very much the worse for wear. Thus Beckwith's theory of a Finite God; Wieman's theory of God as a Phase of the Behavior of the Universe, and G. B. Smith's theory of God as that Quality in Environment that Sustains Human Values.

5. Closely related to theology, but essentially philosophical, is the theory of the absolute. The absolute whether basically psychic or otherwise, puts the end in the beginning. All things work together for good. The outcome is sure. There is no ultimate hazard. The eternal rearrangement of parts constitutes the activity of the whole. Novelty is out of the question. The universe is sewed up from everlasting to everlasting. In its more extravagant moods, this theory is not satisfied with fixing the part irrevocably within the whole; it also puts the whole within every part. The idea of the absolute, however, is facing more and more opposition till one may perhaps safely predict the abolition of the absolute. The good, the true and the beautiful are being transformed into the idea of good things, true occurrences, and beautiful situations. The theory of the relativity of things seems to be making great headway in all fields of thought. Not even the speed of light

may be said to be absolute. At best, the accepted rate of the speed of light is only approximate. Light is not constant when passing through water or through a gravitational center. The "am—was—evermore—shall—be" arrangement, whether applied to parts only, or to the whole increasingly seems an unlikely situation. But, no doubt, in due course, someone will claim that the principle of relativity is itself absolute and then the old warfare will be fought over again. But for spiritual purposes, the absolute is losing its significance.

6. In contrast with theocracy is the old naturalism. Where theocracy is dualistic, even with the doctrine of immanence taken into consideration, naturalism is monistic. It keeps all within one being. Supernatural becomes a term of reproach. But unfortunately the old naturalism is defective in that it oversimplifies the nature of things. It reduces the higher to nothing but the lower. The evolutionary idea had not gained great headway even in naturalistic circles when the old naturalism was at its height. So no place is provided for genuine novelty. Mind, itself, is not taken seriously even as a variant of matter. The old naturalism is imprisoned within the facts and ideas and categories of the exact sciences. The biology and the psychology of the 19th century were far from being the valid sciences that they are today. So the tendency of the old naturalism is to bring mind down to brain as kinetically conceived, instead of bring brain up to mind as empirically known as is the present tendency with evolutionary naturalists. But in contrast with the old theocracy, the old naturalism is to be commended for attempting to explain the order of the universe on the basis of efficient causes without calling into service the doctrine of final ends as consciously held in the purposes of God.

7. But after all the battle is between vitalism and mechanism both of which are more significant as representing large points of view than they are as representing careful analysis. Vitalism has an effective protest against the cocksureness of mechanism, or at least of some mechanists. It is a thorn in the flesh of scientists who are tempted to wander along the road of vague generalization. It is a fighting philosophy. It searches diligently for holes in the armour of its opponents and upon finding them fires with sure aim. Had vitalism stopped with this negative aspect it would still be worth special note. Its purpose, however, is not merely that of one

who loves argument. It really believes in dualism. It challenges the self sufficiency of the so-called physical realm. It posits a non-physical agency, an *elan vital*, to explain the processes which it believes cannot be explained mechanistically. Prof. Roy Wood Sellers, the leader of the American Critical Realists, says that "it is a mistaken philosophy that makes the vitalists dualists." "As the physical world was ordinarily conceived by scientists they had a right to be dualists. They were simply more courageous and more speculatively inclined than the ordinary experimentalist. But I do not think that they were very original, or they would have attacked the adequacy of traditional mechanism and the exclusion of mind and consciousness from the organic level of the physical world. They have, it seems to me, not been courageous enough. Why did they accept the traditional limitations assigned to the physical? The suspicion will not down that they were idealists at heart. Driesch and Bergson assuredly are and, from his interest in psychical research, I infer that McDougall is likewise. It is this too ready acceptance of the stereotyped view of the physical which betrays them."

8. The mechanists, on the other hand, encourage detail experimentation. They hunt down correlations. They search for differences that really make a difference. They try to find out how in point of fact organisms really work. And it is hardly fair to identify present day mechanism with mechanism of the old materialism. The ever ready machine theory is not to be identified with mechanism. Chemical and biological processes do not act as do the parts of a machine. In other words, mechanism is expanding to fit the observed unitary facts of nature. Organism is mechanistic, but not in the kinetic sense; and it is vitalistic, but not in the dualistic sense. It seems to me that controversy is reaching a stage where vitalism and mechanism are merging into an organic, unitary view of being.

9. It may be that we shall find even the term "organism" too small for philosophical purposes, but at present it seems to be a suitable term. Organic suggests the dominance of the teleological. That is to say, an organism seems to function to some purpose, form and process being subordinate to ends. Furthermore, the organic idea suggests evolutionary processes, purposive capacities, creative levels, plastic diversity, uniqueness, mutual support and the

like. In the organic idea we may find a harmony of nature embodying all that is really essential in the old ideas of purpose. In an organism the past lives effectively in the present and projects itself into the future. Each organic level is what it is,—physically, chemically, psychologically, but the whole is a greater than the sum of its parts: and even the parts are different when in the total setting from what they are in isolation. In the organic there is an empirical teleology not found in the inorganic realm. There is a cumulative creative synthesis. The organic rises to mental levels. The idea of the future is purposive in the present. The organic realm seems to move toward increasing harmony.

THE NATURE OF GOD

BY ANITA MARIS BOGGS

WHAT is God? The most learned metaphysician and the most ignorant savage alike reply "He is unknowable." Only the mystic philosopher knows that God *IS*. He knows, for he contacted God. He has experienced Him in an experience that exceeds ecstasy, as ecstasy exceeds the normal mode of thought. The ecstasy of St. Theresa, of St. Anthony of Padua, of St. John of the Cross, of Swedenborg, of Jacob Boehme, of Dionysius the Areopagite, of Iamblichus, of the Buddhists in Nirvana, of the Sufien, is the ineffable union of the soul with a conscious being of a nature apparently indescribable, so far does it exceed human thought or terms. It is beyond thought, for the mind enters the union as a secondary factor. Both mind and soul are receptive, negative to the force that comes swirling into them. This force interpenetrates every part of the soul and then the mind until the soul feels itself identified with, yet in some incomprehensible fashion, still a distinct entity from this all pervasive power.

This identification is the supreme moment of the Sufien, the mystic sect of Mohammedanism, the one religion that is strictly unitarian, that countenances no subsidiary gods. To this end, the Zirk is held weekly. Certain ritualistic motions, dances and intoning are begun until, all in unison of bodies, minds and voices give a prolong high pitched cry "WHO-OO" as it sounds to a western ear. With this mystic arabic name of God, they fall on their hands and knees in adoration of the glorious influx of spirit that they all await eagerly, but, except to the chosen few, almost in vain. For this power chooses to whom it will flow consciously. The tantrik and yogi training of the Far East, seek the same, the annihilation of all thought in Samadhi or Union.

The bliss of this union is sufficient to the mystic. Blessed is the soul that has contacted once the pervasive force of Love. Who, in a lifetime contacts it twice, is a saint. Who lives in continual consciousness, is a being beyond the ken of man.

Through the years, the memory lingers for one who has once contacted this bliss and the taste remains. "Sweeter also than the honey and the honey comb" sings the psalmist. Life and its experiences assume a new meaning in the light of the inner vision, a light that may at times be clouded like the sun, but is never extinguished. Who experiences only the Light, experiences the glare. Who stands twice in the presence of God is a saint. Love radiates from him, like a light from an encasing alabaster bowl. By their very presence the saints inspire. Conscious of the exquisiteness of God, they desire only to taste again of His Being. They seek not to serve the world but to enjoy Him. Hear how the Persian mystic one of the greatest of the Sufien, Jalau'uddin Al Rumi, sings of the soul and the almightiness of God in his Mathnawi—

" Do me right, O glory of the Righteous, O Thou who art the dias and I, the threshold of Thy door.

" Where are the threshold and the dias in reality? In the quarter where our Beloved is; where are 'we' and 'I'?

" O Thou whose soul is free from 'we' and 'I,' O Thou who art the subtle essence of the spirit in man and woman,

" When man and woman become one, Thou art that One; when the units are wiped out, lo, Thou art that Unity.

" Thou didst contrive this 'I' and 'we' that Thou mightest play the game of worship with Thyself,

" That all 'I's' and 'thou's' should become one soul and at last should be submerged into the Beloved.

" All this is, and do Thou come, O Thou who givest the command BE, O Thou who transcendest 'Come' and all speech.

" The body can see Thee only in the fashion of the body: it fancies Thy sadness and laughter.

" Do not say that the heart that is bound (by such bodily attributes) is worthy of seeing Thee.

" Who is bound by sadness and laughter is living by means of these two borrowed attributes.

" In the verdant garden of Love, which is without end, there are many fruits besides sorrow and joy.

- “ Love is higher than these two states of feeling, without spring and without autumn it is ever green and fresh.” (Lines 1783-1794.)
- “ Our emotion is not caused by grief, our consciousness is not related to fancy and imagination.
- “ There is another state of consciousness that is rare: do thou not disbelieve for God is very mighty.
- “ Do not judge from the normal state of man, do not abide in wrong or well doing.
- “ Wrong and well doing, grief and joy are things that come into existence; those that come into existence die: God is their heir. (*Lines* 1804-1806.)

THE ALMIGHTINESS OF GOD

- “ We have spoken all these words but in preparing ourselves we are naught, naught without the favours of God.
- “ Without the favours of God and God's elect, angel tho he be, his page is dark.
- “ O God, O Thou whose bounty fulfils every need, it is not allowable to mention anyone beside Thee.
- “ This amount of guidance, hast Thou bestowed upon us; till this time Thou hast covered up many a fault of ours.
- “ Cause the drop of knowledge which Thou gaves to us heretofore, to become united with Thy seas.
- “ In my soul there is a drop of knowledge: deliver it from sensuality and from the body's clay.
- “ Before these clays drink it up, before these winds sweep it away. Although when they sweep it away, Thou art able to take it back from them and redeem it.
- “ The drop that vanished in the air or was spilled on the earth, when did it flee from the storehouse of Thy omnipotence?
- “ If entered into non-existence or a hundred non-existences, it will make a foot of its head (will return in headlong haste) when Thou callest it.
- “ Hundreds of thousands of opposites are killing their opposites: Thy decree is calling them forth again into existence.
- “ There is caravan on caravan, O God, speeding from non-existence into existence.
- “ In particular, every night all thoughts and understandings become

- naught, plunged into the deep Sea.
- " Again at dawn those Divine ones lift up their heads like fishes, from the Sea.
- " In the autumn the myriads of boughs and leaves go into rout into the Sea of Death.
- " In the garden, the crow clothed in black like a mourner makes lament over the greenery.
- " Again from the Lord of the land comes the edict to Non-existence 'Give back what thou hast devoured.'
- " O, brother, collect thy wits for an instant: from moment to moment, incessantly there is autumn and spring within thee.
- " Behold the garden of the heart, green and moist and fresh, full of rosebuds, and cypress and jasmine;
- " Boughs hidden by multitudes of leaves, vast plain and high palace hidden by the multitude of flowers.
- " These words which are from the Universal Reason, are the scent of those flowers and hyacinths and cypresses.
- " Didst thou ever smell the rose where no rose is? The scent is thy guide and conducts thee on thy way.
- " The scent is a remedy for the eye: it is light making. (*Jalalu'uddin Al Rumi*, translated by R. A. Nicholson, Cambridge University Press, 1926.)

To the mystic God is Love to be experienced through the complete merging of all the senses in the supreme act of union. Exultantly sings Jalalu'uddin "I am the Beloved."

Not all human nature is capable of enjoying God, or if such enjoyment has been had, of resting content without explanation of the essential nature of Love and the Beloved. Mind acting without its master love rarely rises to the heights attained by the emotional soul. Its methods are those of ordinary life and so are more understandable by the man of the world. Mind searching the inherent nature of God uses the same methods it would employ in learning to drive a car. First the trial and error method with more errors than success, then concentrated study of the general aspect of the thing as a whole ending with a general hazy knowledge of the aspect or outer appearance or manifestation but no real knowledge, scientific or otherwise, of real motive force inherent in the gasoline, the electric starting spark, or the physical laws governing the motor, generating the power.

Plato, the great Greek philosopher, speculated on the nature of

God. When he formulated the doctrine of the Archetypes, he sought to penetrate the mystery through mind. Positing the highest abstract ideas of which man is capable, he placed these in-forming ideas in invisibility, in unchanging existence: "Does the being, which in our dialectic we define as meaning absolute existence, remain always in the same state, or does it change? Do absolute equality, absolute beauty, and every absolute existence admit any change at all, or does the absolute existence in each case, being essentially uniform, remain the same and unchanging and never in any case admit of any sort or kind of change whatsoever?" "It must remain the same and unchanging, Socrates," said Cebes.

"And what of the many beautiful things such as men and horses and garments and the like and all of which bear the name of ideas, whether equal, beautiful or anything else? Do they remain the same or is it exactly the opposite with them? In short, do they never remain the same at all, either in themselves or in their relations?"

"These things," said Cebes, "never remain the same."

"You can touch them and see them and perceive them with the other senses while you can grasp the unchanging only with the reasoning of the intellect. These latter are invisible and unseen," said Socrates. (*Phaedo*, XXV.)

THE SOUL AND ITS RELATION TO GOD

Socrates continued, "Our souls exist apart from our bodies and possessed intelligence before they came into man's shape. I shall try to explain to you the kind of Cause at which I have worked and I begin with the assumption that there exists an absolute beauty, an absolute good, an absolute greatness and so on. It appears to me that if anything besides absolute beauty is beautiful, it is so simply because it partakes of the absolute beauty, and I say the same of all phenomena—Ideas exist and Phenomena take the name of ideas as they participate in them. A concrete thing is generated from its opposite."

"What is that which must be in the body to make it alive? A soul.

"Then the soul always brings life to whatever contains her, and the

"soul does not admit of death? Then the soul must be immortal.

"If the immortal is imperishable, then the soul cannot perish when

"death comes upon her. She will never admit death or be in a

"state of death. And all men must admit," said Socrates, "that

"God and the essential form of life and all else that is immortal
"never perishes." (*Phaedo*, XL et foll.)

In his *Republic*, Plato defines God as: "One and true in word and deed: He neither changes Himself nor deceives others" (379 et foll). "God alone is wise and knows all things," he states in his *Apology*, 30D.

If God is "the wise," emotion naturally is not the medium through which the soul knows God. Speaking through the mouth of Socrates in the *Apology* (30D), Plato gives the method by which he has realized that God is. "God has commanded me to spend my life in searching for wisdom—I have a certain divine sign from God, it is a voice." A voice presupposes a mental capacity to hear, understand, comprehend, to follow and to act according to its dictates. It is the relation of the master to the servant, of the executive to his assistant. There is no thought of enjoyment. The hearer is not an onlooker watching a procession of "caravans on caravans speeding from non-existence into existence." He is one of the caravan and as such can know only the immediate caravan in which he is. He may know or think he knows the general nature and aspect of others. He may have theoretical knowledge that in other caravans the camels of life proceed differently and to different goals. His immediate knowledge, however, is limited to the one at hand. He is concerned with the ultimate destination of that particular caravan, with obeying the orders of the master camel driver, of cooperating with the other travellers in protecting all their goods from the common enemy that roams the desert of existence, whose camels "pad, pad" swiftly over the golden sands of time. Darting like a shooting star, the enemy attacks the little camp when the watchman's fires burn low. He seizes the travellers. When morning comes, only the camel tracks lead to the horizon. Silent tracks in silent sands to show that once a caravan passed this way. With the sun rises the wind, the sands dance in the heat, revolve in eddies, the camel tracks vanish.

The caravan that has vanished? The master camel driver and his men, the travellers and the camels, all know only that they go not where they had planned. They are carried by a force superior to their own to some unknown destination whose path they know not nor the perils, nor joy, that may await them. Their minds are sand grains swirling with the wind, now alighting here, now

alighting there, drifting into the whirlwinds of indecision, fear and confusion.

Who knows all the caravan routes of God? Who has pitched his black tent of woven camel's hair at all the oases of experience? Who has explored all the modes and moods of the winds of life? The master of the caravan knows his course across the trackless desert, he knows his camels and he knows the cool oases ahead. His road is but one of the infinity of roads. God opens the way and His winds obliterate the tracks.

Can the mind of man in a myriad of lives, travel the path of each star in its course? Can a single mouth drink all the drops in the Sea of Wisdom? Passing through the daily experiences of life, man's mind, like the bee sips now of the jasmine, now of the rose, and often of the bitter aloes. It sips and distills the honey of life in the dark cell of the comb. Of the nature and purpose of the rose, it neither knows nor desires to know. It is content to gather one drop from the infinity of beauty.

Mind is an attribute. It fashions God according to its experiences and the physical environment in which it manifests itself through the body. The highest abstract conception of the bushman of Australia scarcely equals in nobility the lowest material concept of civilized man. Plato posits God as Absolute Idea. The soul, being intelligent, may grasp some conception of God's inherent nature. The God of Plato is a concatenation of attributes and categories, mutually exclusive and therefore infinite. He posits absolute Time, absolute Space, absolute Equality, absolute Beauty, absolute Goodness, absolute Wisdom. How can more than one infinite exist in time or space concurrently? If time and space are eliminated as categories or mental concepts, then all the attributes, the Wise, the Beautiful, the Good must equally be eliminated and the God of abstract mind disappears into complete annihilation.

Reason and judgment are not content to let God disappear in the mists of abstractions. God *is*. God *creates*, God is *omniscient*. What God is, how He creates and why He creates is beyond all possible knowing. The mystic may enjoy God but the mind of man may never attain to the essence of God nor the purpose and method of creation. Dionysius the Areopagite, a christian father and neoplatonist writing probably in the fourth or fifth century after Christ, expresses the position of those to whom God is unknowable:

“ Once more ascending yet higher, we maintain that it (God) is not soul, nor mind, one endowed with the faculty of imagination, conjecture, reason nor understanding; nor is It any act of reason nor understanding, nor can It be described, by reason nor perceived by the understanding, since It has not number, nor order, nor greatness or littleness, nor equality nor inequality, and since It is not immovable, nor in motion nor at rest and has no power and is not power nor light and does not live and is not life; nor is It personal essence or eternity, nor can it be grasped by the understanding since It is not knowledge nor truth; nor is It kingship nor wisdom; nor is It One, nor is It unity; nor is It Godhead nor goodness, nor is It a Spirit as we understand spirit, nor is It the Sonship nor the Fatherhood, nor is It any other such thing as we or any other being can have knowledge of, nor does it belong to the category of non existence or to that of existence: nor do existent things know It as It actually is; nor does It know them as they actually are; nor can reason attain to It: to name It: nor to know it: nor is It darkness nor is It light; nor is It error nor truth; nor can any affirmation nor negation apply to It: for while applying affirmations or negations to those orders of beings that come next to It, we apply not unto It either affirmation nor negations inasmuch as It transcends all affirmation by being the perfect and unique Cause of all things and transcends all negation by the preeminence of Its simple and absolute nature—free from all limitation and beyond them all” (*The Mystical Theology*, Ch. V).”

Denying all attributes to God, Dionysius by his very negation posits a God more noble more lofty than the highest abstraction of that great master mind of Plato could conceive. The God of Dionysius is beyond the reach of the mystic soul that would lose itself in the enjoyment of beatitude; It is beyond the mind that would infer Its existence through reasoning from the visible to the invisible from the concrete to the abstract. It is a God beyond absoluteness for It is the Cause. It is unique.

God is unique, unknowable, beyond the reach of the soul of man or of his mind, yet Dionysius can describe fully what God is not and by the nullification of categories and abstractions of existence can present a viril God that is real, that is. When he ascribes affirma-

tions and negations to those orders of beings that come next to it," he refers to the Archetypes of Plato, to the archangels of Jalalu'uddin and the hierarchies of the occult schools. Would Dionysius perhaps retort to the cry of Jalalu'uddin "I am the Beloved": "True, the Beloved of the hierarchy of Love, an order of beings that shadow forth but an aspect of God but who are not God." To Plato, "You have contacted the formative Ideas but God you know not." Perhaps Plato would reply "What O Dionysius is your God?" The Areopagite could but reply "My God is the inscrutable Cause. *What It is* I do not know."

The mystics conceived God through their emotions, They describe positively or negatively, by attributes, "love," "beauty," holiness," goodness," "beyond all goodness, all life, all essence, all unity" or negatively "He is not essence, nor life etc." Plato, Aristotle and the followers of "reason," throughout the centuries find God through logic, reason, understanding and wisdom. For Aristotle, "God is the formal Cause, the efficient Cause and the End." Man is in the same relation to God as the object to the subject with "be" balancing them. Since man is a thinking being, he may know God as God is Thought in its essence. The nature of God to him is the quintessence of his own desirable qualities to the superlative.

Is either the soul or reason satisfied with "God is good," "God is love," God is beyond unity," God is beyond all comprehension, "He is joy," "He is beauty," "He is ineffable?" Is this abstract God more appealing than the anthropomorphic jealous God of the ancient Hebrews or the amorous gods of the Greeks or the modern God of battles who is always on the side of the prayer makers of that moment, or the whimsical God who is swayed by the selfish aims of man to change the weather to suit his wishes or to set aside laws of human making that the prayer may escape some well merited punishment, about to be inflicted by his fellow beings. Anthropomorphic or abstract, what *is* God?

God is. In the simplicity of the statement is the great mystery clear. To Be, means of itself, Immortality, Infinitude, the Formal, the Efficient Cause, the End, the Lover and the Beloved, the Thought and the Thinker, the Created and the Creator.

To exist presupposes something or cause from and by which existence is made manifest. To be is Life: God is Life. What

Life is, is indeed unknowable and the mystic is right when he cries "It is beyond all knowing." Life is both imminent and transcendent; It is both sentient and conscious and purposeful. Things do not have life: Life creates forms. "Mother Nature" is not distinct from Life: It is Life. Plato asked: "What is it that makes the soul live?" "Life," answered his pupil. "There is caravan on caravan speeding from non-existence into existence," sing Jalalu'uddin. From invisibility Life is coagulating into visibility and dissolving again into seeming invisibility. Life is a river. It flows, It forms bubbles of existence. Wind, earth, water, fire, ether are forms of motion. Life is the power that generates motion and It is the motion. "Beyond life" or "non-existence" are two mists of the mind. There is nothing but Life. Even non existence, nothingness must have Life to *be*. Without Life there is no "Goodness," "Pity," "Equality," "Number." Nor is there category nor attribute, for without Life no thought exists, thought is the product of Life.

Were Life definable it would not be unique. Its action may be described and felt but its essence as such is incomprehensible. Everything that exists is Life, man is Life but who knows what Life Is?

Flowing is the essential characteristic of Life. It has five proper motions, with many sub-motions and interblendings. These motions are centrifugal, centripetal, forward, descending and ascending. Centripetal, descending flowing is Life taking on form. It coagulates within Itself into nuclei, like the start nebulae of the various universes that in turn precipitate denser and denser matter until the seeming density of solid rock is visible. Yet it is all Life. When Life flows forward on a given plane, It is experiencing equilibrium. Such equilibrium constitute the "Night of Existence" or "*pralaya*" of eastern religions. Centrifugal, ascending force is the breaking up of form.

Life is a circular cell, of self imposed limitations. It forms within Itself at Its pleasure and for Its pleasure, a universe or a canary. It alone limits Itself. It contracts Itself into any form It desires, ever without disruption. It contains all and is contained of all. It has all attributes and is all attributes. It is Thought and the Thinker: It is Love and the Beloved. It is purpose: It is Will: It IS.

Life acts upon Itself-Life. The more subtle, the more refined.

the light, penetrates the heavier part of Itself called substance or Nature. Yet both are Life. The gentle friction of two degrees of Life, drawing towards each other is love; hate is the heat engendered friction of a higher or subtler life penetrating, boring through heavier, gross substance. All Life is conscious. Its degree of consciousness is according to and in direct ratio with the subtlety of Its form. The gross heavy substance is lethargically aware It will be destroyed by the penetrating beams. It gathers Itself into greater density darkness and more compact cohesion to resist destruction. This concentration for resistance is what man calls "evil." It has no reality except under the mental concept of time and space for in essence the resister is identical with the resisted. Eventually they neutralize each other. Life creating in Itself is the father side of God: Life created in Itself in the mother side of God—both are one.

If Life is God and consciousness is an inalienable attribute of all that is, since all is Life and that consciousness is active according to the subtlety of the form in which It is manifesting, what is the soul, and what is its purpose? The soul is simply a more subtle form of Life that interpenetrates the grosser coagulation known as body. Mind is another form of subtle Life, but not so subtle as soul. Mind, by exercise and conscious use may be developed, the exercise and constant use being but the coagulating of the form of Life manifesting as mind, the concentrating of it along definite lines whence it flows, following the five proper motions of its nature, Life. As mind may be so developed, so may the soul force be coagulated and concentrated until it assumes definite form and as such is able to act as a receiving substance for a high, still more subtle flowing of Life even as the body has received it. In the union with the higher, subtler Life, is experienced the ecstasy, the ineffable moment of contact with the Beloved. The higher Life interpenetrates every cell of the soul, to use finite terms, as a river in flood, overflows its banks and seems to obliterate all boundaries. As the river fertilizes the ground of itself, so is the soul fertilized by the essence of the higher Life. Life makes time, space and form: into Life dissolve time, space and form. When the essence of man consciously concentrates Itself, his soul becomes self-conscious, It knows that It is a drop of the Sea of Being. Only those who have experienced the ineffable union can comprehend even

faintly the indescribable joy. The mystic is content to enjoy, to sing: "I am the Beloved."

Is enjoyment all that God expects of his creatures, a mutual enjoyment of each other? If so then the attributes of mind, will purpose and power are superfluous. Does God perhaps desire Its creatures to imitate It and, proceeding along lines of creation conceived by It, create in a lesser fashion on a lower substratum, that the creatures of the creatures shall seek their creator and through the infinity of creators raise themselves to the ultimate—Life Itself, found but never comprehended? To create mind calls into being its attributes will purpose and power. Mind functioning through such attributes is but blind, functioning on one plane only unless it is interpenetrated consciously by the subtler Life of the soul. Man may learn the laws of creation and become a cocreator with God to the degree limited only by the rarity of the Life force within him. Man is God as a drop of water is the ocean only so far however as Life is, and Life is identical in all form and in the absence of form.

The Life that man treats so casually and pretends to despise is his very divinity. With his modicum of brain he may use his Life for constructive or destructive ends. He may continue to flow on one plane through his entire manifestation as a human entity or he may concentrate both his mind and soul forces, marry them as it were in a marriage with the Life of higher existence and so become conscious and capable of manifesting on other planes of existences. If he does this, he elevates his entire environment.

Jesus said "I am the way, the truth and the life. If ye had known me ye would have known my Father also. I am in the Father and the Father in me."

BEHAVIORISM UNMASKED

BY D. E. PHILLIPS

FOR the last twenty or thirty years we have been gradually drifting towards some form of determinism in human conduct. I say some *form of determinism* because there is a wide difference, yes, a gulf between *mind determinism* such as held by Adler and others that all human thinking and behavior is fundamentally purposive and directed by some underlying force to a goal, and that chance mechanistic and atomistic determinism into which many modern thinkers are drifting. We have, it is true, been forced to recognize that every variation in structure and chemical composition of the body modifies our thoughts and feelings. However, no one has as yet pointed out the exact causes of all these minute changes. We also see the curve of mental life rise and decline with the growth, development, and decay of the body. We also note that certain brain processes seem to be the condition of consciousness.

Heredity gives us certain dominant instinctive tendencies which map out the chief line of human action, feeling, and thinking. Such conduct is soon converted into habits most of which operate without the interference of consciousness. These habits drift most of us to our eternal destiny. Again, many forms of human behavior seem to be under the guidance of some unconscious mental force.

Either line of facts naturally leads to the question as to how far the individual and society can consciously direct their destiny. Out of these perplexing problems the bastard child Behaviorism has been born, and now seems to be dominated by the idea that nothing but *mechanism shall remain in the universe*.

Why do I say "dominated by the idea?" According to the behavioristic doctrine neither purpose nor consciousness is ever a

cause. It is only an accompanying phenomenon. I should have said that certain neurones in the brains of these behaviorists were set in motion by the adequate stimulus and formed a *neural pattern*. But how did this original *adequate stimulus* happen to set up a motion in the neurones of these behaviorists that has been going on for years? And how have these neurones compelled *them* to a definite line of activity all this time? What is the state of these neurones and synaptic connections that forced them to perform delicate experiments? If any behaviorist will explain his own *behavior* in writing a book, in hunting persistently for things to support his doctrine, in trying to explain wit and humor as having their origin in the sensitive zones of the body—I say if he will explain his own conduct in these things without any reference to *purpose* and show that he really believes what he says about his own behavior—we might understand him. We have had no such personal application of the doctrine. This same consciousness which he would ignore tells him that his *conscious purpose* is a force in writing his book. If he does succeed in transferring all these intellectual forces to the neurones, he will simply endow them with the mysticism which he wishes to escape.

A short time ago, in talking with a defender of behaviorism who at least prides himself on his ability to direct his own thoughts, I said, "Wait a minute. Come squarely to the question. Do you mean to say that your present thoughts have absolutely nothing to do with the thoughts that shall follow?" Of course he hesitated and would not give an answer to the question.

Thus we have the heart of the behavioristic difficulty and the one that directs most of the disguised arguments in the treatment of instinct, of inherited traits, of talents or capacities, of imitation, of suggestion, of emotions as glandular and visceral action, of wit and humor as originating from the sensitive zones of the body.

Behaviorism has forced psychology to become more accurate and scientific. Secondly, it has demonstrated a much larger field of mechanistic behavior than psychology once recognized or admitted. Thirdly, it has forced a desirable modification of our ideas of instinct. Fourthly, it has extended, to great advantage, the place of habit and of the "conditioned reflex" in the formation of habit. Finally, behaviorism has helped to clarify the learning process.

With such an array of achievement, what could be said against the behavioristic doctrine? It is the same fault which Aristotle said we everywhere find in adolescents—the *fault of carrying everything to extremes*. Let us examine these views as represented by the extremes I have already mentioned.

I. *Instinct must go, we have no use for the word*, says the behavioristic theory. Some years ago when the behaviorists made gogues became frightened and said if we continue to use the word *instinct* we shall be classified with the *mystics*. Those who did these bold statements several psychologists and especially pedant even surmise the pure materialism into which they were being led looked for some compromise term. So we find today such terms as *human urges, drives, organized impulses, original nature, prepotent tendencies, dominant tendencies*, and *innate dominate adjustments*. Will anyone be deluded into thinking he has avoided mysticism by the use of any of these terms? Or will he abolish any implication of *purpose* which is the chief concern of the behavioristic doctrine? Several of these educational writers set forth what they think is the behavioristic doctrine and proclaim their change of heart, and avow their *purpose* to use some of these terms instead of instinct. So we have two well known authors saying, "We follow strictly the line of argument used by the extreme physiological psychologists." Yet the whole book is built on the assumption that mind is a real cause of conduct. We are told that we "must recognize the child's interest," that "social impulses motivate adaptation." Dominant *drives* are often mentioned. We have a section on "our organism seeking its own end." In general, behaviorism avoids the use of such terms as above mentioned and uses instead *neural patterns, stimulus—response—mechanisms, chain reflexes, neuro-muscular units*. All of this brings to mind forcibly what Schwarz says about the semi- or pseudo-original man. "The appearance of originality is more to him than the reality of it." Many words become popular not because of their meaning or usefulness, but because of their noble origin.

I have just finished an examination of 150 books on psychology, all written in the last fifteen years. Fully eighty percent of them remain unmodified by the behavioristic movement so far as the use of the word *instinct* is concerned. It should be added that the behaviorists have compelled all psychologists to a more careful

use of the term *instinct*, and have shown us the excessive tendency to expand instinct into the field of habit. But Morgan as early as 1898 inaugurated this scientific inquiry as to the relation between habit and instinct in his book *Habit and Instinct*.

One behavioristic book tries to make an ingenious substitution for all instincts: *six prepotent tendencies*. Is not this all we have ever meant by *instinct*—a tendency to fight, to get angry, to manifest fear, love, and jealousy? No, he would save his behavioristic ideas by putting this prepotency in the nervous mechanism and reducing them to six physical manifestations. These are *starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reaction* (not hunger), *sensitive zone reactions*, and *sex reactions*. These constitute the physical mechanism out of which all other activities develop. So our author talks of prepotent needs, prepotent urges, and prepotent habits. However, he has found that these did not supply *his need*, so he uses over thirty terms implying the essential idea as found in the most careful writers on instinct.

Here is the question we wish to put to any writer following these lines: If everything in this universe should be wiped out and nothing left but the physical conditions as we have known them since historic times, and the human race should start its development anew with just these *six prepotent tendencies*, would such a race not in the run of ages develop habits, customs and institutions similar to ours? I say *similar*, and that is all any believer in instincts expects. Would not men develop warring and strife, marriage and family life of some kind, crime and religion, poverty and wealth, jealousy and love? Have we not this proof in the history of mankind? The explanation that this generation was taught these things by the previous generation is only a delusion and a make-believe explanation. Where did the first generations get these things? Where did these patterns come from if acquired characteristics and habits are not transmissible?

If I were a strict behaviorist I would turn heaven and earth to prove that acquired characteristics are inherited. Then I could have some kind of argument as a substitute for purposive, dynamic action.

Professor Watson says there are thousands of variations laid down in the germ plasm. Here to deny both the inheritance of acquired characteristics and all kinds of purposive behavior takes us

clear back to Democritus with electrons and protons falling together by haphazard chance through an *eternity of time* until they *happened* to fall together and so produce what *only appears* to be purposive action. According to their doctrine even Professor Watson and his followers are not guided by any desire or purpose to make the world better or to teach us anything. By some chance variation in the protons and electrons, the brain processes have just chanced to develop in them this line of behavior.

Smith and Guthrie in their *General Psychology* say that "conviction and belief may be described as the attachment of response tendencies to verbal statements." Moral conviction consists in saying the thing is wrong. "A volitional act," they say, "is the outcome of a delayed reaction." If you should appeal to me for one hundred dollars to save a group of flood-stricken refugees from starving, and if I should think it over for an hour or even all night, and then say, "Yes, I will give it," such would be a delayed neural action. I might *think* that my *thinking* had something to do with the final outcome, but it did not. As soon as the brain reaction was completed the answer was inevitable. If you ask what delays the brain reaction a day, a month, or year, the only answer is other brain reactions.

II. There is no such thing as *inherited traits, talents*, or temperaments says the leader of this school. In all of these cases Professor Watson and others are careful to take the cases of moderate differences: hypothetical cases such as two boys, where one is the favorite of the mother and the other of the father. The one becomes a painter and the other a warrior. But why do they not account for our idiots and imbeciles, for Socrates, Mozart, Napoleon, Gauss, Leonardo, and Lincoln? If you want to see a psychological law, take your outstanding cases first. If any one admits that there are born into this world idiots and imbeciles, will he assume that there is a definite limit where imbecility ceases and from that point all individuals are alike? For example, if we admit any variation in natural mathematical ability at all, does it not stand to reason that there are all degrees of variation, even though we cannot detect it in all cases? If there are no degrees of inheritance, then the whole fabric of intelligence tests is a delusion and a snare.

Suppose the germ plasm should from some unknown cause vary so as to produce some physical modification in the endocrine glands,

and this in turn should be accompanied by some unusual neural activity which resulted in a *prepotent tendency* to music or to murder. Why not say the individual inherited a tendency for music or for murder? There is only one reason—this might imply that something intellectual or emotional was inherited—some *purposive behavior*.

Professor Watson rests his claim that there are no intellectual and emotional race differences largely on the assumption that *pride of race* has kept us from admitting that there are no differences. But how did this pride of race get started? Is there nothing in original nature that *inevitably* leads to *pride of race*? When he asserts that right-handedness is due to social usage, can he offer the slightest suggestion why it is so universal? Did it accidentally start with Adam and Eve and has it been scattered all over the world by social custom? It is easy to explain existing things by social custom as long as one does not attempt to explain the origin and development of social custom.

I thoroughly agree that many of the individual differences and a large percent of what is generally attributed to inheritance of traits and talents are due to early happenings in life. This is true whether you look at the facts from the point of view of the Freudians or the Behaviorists. I will even go beyond this and emphasize the place of chance happenings in life and their power to determine destiny. But, as already stated, the chief sin of behaviorism is to carry everything to extremes. Their fear lest they leave any indication of mind as a cause of purposive behavior sometimes drives them headlong into pure nonsense, such as the admission of instincts in animals but the denial of them in man, the development of all human behavior out of "squirmings," the denial of degrees of intellectual ability and thereby the discrediting of all intelligence tests, the futile effort to trace wit and humor to the sensitive zones of the body.

III. For obvious reasons, *imitation* has been one of the main lines of attack. No one denies that many of the early social psychologists and popular lecturers on human conduct unduly expanded and exaggerated the place of imitation. But the behaviorist sees in any kind of imitation the implication of purposive action. So they have worked hard and long with animals to show that they do not imitate. But why carry these results over to human conduct when Professor Watson says that because animals have in-

stinets in no wise proves that man has them also. If a positive result cannot be carried over with *some basis of scientific inference*, why carry over a negative one?

Professor Allport finds it very necessary to dispose of imitation in connection with the development of speech. He says, "The child does not imitate or duplicate the speech of his elders. There is evoked simply the nearest similar ear-vocal reflex, which, with his present limitation of pronouncing, he has been able to fixate." Again, the whole attempt is to rule out any implication of purposive behavior. He says, "Imitation would simply be voluntarily copying them." He seems unable to conceive of purposive behavior that is not voluntarily conscious.

As over and against this, Koehler states in his *Mentality of Apes* that "even animal psychologists have not always paid sufficient attention to this fundamental difference between "simple" human imitation and the imitation we so lightly expect from animals, and so people were to a certain extent astonished when it was first shown experimentally that animals do not as easily imitate as expected. Less astonishment would perhaps have been felt if it had been realized that, after all, man has first to understand in some degree before it even occurs to him to imitate." He finally shows that the chimpanzee does exhibit four kinds of imitation and that there is no *mere imitation* without a trace of insight.

IV. Suggestion is so closely related to imitation as to arouse the same fears. For this reason you **do not find the behaviorist** dealing with the striking difficulties that are presented in psychiatry and abnormal psychology in general. Suggestion is reduced to the power of the spoken word over the bodily mechanism. The strictly objective method precludes any consideration of dreams, delusions, subjective pains and symptoms.

V. "Emotion," we are told by Professor Watson, "is an hereditary pattern reaction, involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems. In *Psychologies of 1925* the same writer tells us that there are only three original pattern reactions which correspond to what we call fear, rage, and love. All others are developed out of conditioned responses. Professor Allport, following this line of conditioned responses, stretches it to the limit in explaining away sympathy. We all believe in conditioned responses, and thousands

of activities that once had no satisfactory explanation belong to this group. This is especially true in the field of sex peculiarities and abnormalities. But here is the point I want to emphasize. *Generally speaking the more securely grounded a conditioned response is, the closer related it is to some original prepotent tendency, and in many cases the relation is so close that it is only quibbling to say that one is an original pattern and the other acquired.* It seems that one carries with it the other. Herein lies the fundamental problem as to the number of inherited tendencies and instincts. It cannot be solved with our present state of knowledge. Jealousy, says behaviorism, is not inherent or instinctive, but is a result of human society. But would not any peoples, given the prepotent tendencies our behaviorists grant, develop jealousy? Are we not then quibbling as to whether it is a part of our native equipment?

Again, if human individuals everywhere develop a response called *laughter* and some degree of wit and humor, why not say that human individuals are so constituted that when adequately stimulated they show a tendency to such behavior, and save the stretch of our imagination in trying to show their habitual origin from the *sensitive zone*? There is only one sound reason why they do not: these activities suggest purposive behavior.

VI. Finally, we owe much to the behaviorists for their diligent and *purposive* research work on learning by *trial and error*. Yerkes' and Koehler's researches do not substantiate the extreme faith of the behaviorists in *trial and error*. Koehler says, "I know that several psychologists will not easily believe that my description of intellectual behavior in apes is correct."

Even within their own ranks come many dissenting votes. Professor Tolman in the *Psychological Review* for July, 1925, shows that goal-seeking is an essential part of animal behavior. He says that prepotent tendencies are to be recognized by the *teleological patterns* of the final goals which they achieve.

All psychology attempts to explain behavior, while behaviorism is a study of mechanistic physiology. In this sense the behaviorist may apply a quantitative scientific method, but he can never explain behavior or evaluate conduct. On the other hand, I do not believe that it is possible for those of us who admit mental activity, consciousness, and purpose as causes of conduct to be scientifically accurate in the sense of the physical sciences.

By behavioristic methods we may measure physical behavior, but I for one do not believe we shall ever explain or understand human behavior without a consideration of the fundamental human impulses, motives, desires, needs, wants, and life-interests. The explanation of momentarily controlled behavior is one thing, and that of permanent life-interests quite another. Human life has its roots in life-impulses, cravings, and some kind of universal tendencies, while the environment is only secondary and a modifying force.

What a fruitless argument we have had about introspective psychology plunging us into mysticism. Did any one ever stop to contemplate the mystery of the synoptic theory? Can you think of a greater mystery than to place all that has ever been done and attributed to mind in the neurones! How misleading is the catch-word *neural pattern*! Try to conceive what these neural patterns laid away in the brain are! Neural patterns have been even more misleading than the old idea of sensation as being produced by images transmitted from the outside object. One's imagination might stake off in the cortex a neural pattern for a mountain, but how shall one imagine a persistent neural pattern to write a *Faust*, to conquer the world, to be a Lincoln or a great world leader? Are these patterns localized in definite parts of the cortex? Does consciousness involve the whole of the cortex or only parts of it, or does it shift? Brain surgery and experiments on animals bids fair to revolutionize the whole neuro-synaptic theory.

I cannot help but conceive consciousness as the most complex form of energy known to man and one that is so stabilized as to be in turn one of the causes of human conduct. Even if consciousness is the direct result of cortical action, is it not in keeping with the order of nature that consciousness also may become a cause of activity in human beings?

In conclusion, it seems evident that the gap that separates behaviorism—or mechanistic physiology—from other forms of general psychology is the question of considering any form of mind as a cause, and the attacks of behaviorism on general psychology have as a matter of fact been directed mainly against the points I have mentioned because these manifestations imply *purpose* or some vitalistic force not reducible to electrons and protons as conceived by a mechanistic philosophy. Hence introspection is to be aban-

done as absolutely unscientific and purpose is to be abhorred as leading only to mysticism. All forms of life are to be cast in quantitative measurable terms. All qualitative forms of existence and behavior must be relegated to speculative philosophy.

However, in spite of behaviorism, the value of everything and of life itself will continue to be determined by human desires, feelings, purposes, and strivings. Not only psychologists, but all men will continue to introspect their desires, feelings, ambitions, and destinies. The behaviorists, without knowing it, are on the road to the most incomprehensible mystery the mind of man has ever conceived—*the transfer of all human achievements and civilization to the neurones and synaptic connections*. Yes, even the neurones trying to explain themselves through the behaviorists. Most of us are only advocating and pleading for the legitimate use of any and all methods that will help us to better understand human behavior. That, we think, involves a proper consideration of our native equipment by heredity, the whole physical being, the whole outer conditions, stimulus-response, and all that it is possible to ascertain by legitimate and well-guided introspection. Man does not exist for science, but *science exists to give value to human life*.

A CENTURY OF IBSEN

BY HENRY CHARLES SUTER

ONE hundred years ago, there was born in a Norwegian town an "infant crying in the night" who grew to be a writer, but not one "with no language but a cry." For it has been well cited that Henrik Ibsen became the apostle of those who insist on self-realization and self-expression. In those days Ibsen sensed a devotion to formulas that fostered the use of fantastic phrases that possessed little positive potency. Crowd psychology took the place of individual thinking, and concerted action was more active than careful deliberation.

Echoes multiplied by artifice were glorified as public opinion; mathematical arrangements of votes contrived in consequence, a mechanical conception of society; and ultimately humanitarianism displaced humanism. Ibsen pilloried all this and made his appeal to those who were willing to pay the price of straight thinking.

Ibsen owed little to life's circumstances of lowliness, since his father became insolvent ere he reached the age of eight. So his youth was spent in studying poetry to relieve the monotony of apprenticeship to an apothecary. In his twenties he was aiding the management of the theater of Bergen, his home town, but the chief outcome was that comradery critics caused him to witness drama in larger cities. Before he had seen one play produced, he had written several himself, although these are not found among those preserved for us. The wretched attic in the *Wild Duck* was conjured up in his memory from childhood; when nearly forty he was often unable to buy stamps to dispatch his manuscripts; and even at successful maturity, a "poet's pension" arrived changing need into frugal comfort.

Meanwhile Norway, severed from Denmark in the Napoleonic

age, had a native culture which was considered crude, though confident, in the face of the Danish tradition. Sentiment served instead of sensible thinking, hence Ibsen laughs at the "League of Youth" and at all the fickle elements which compose the "compact liberal majority." In *The Pillars of Society* we see social order based on competitive business, which competition is cited as fraud in its hidden factors, and the conventions thereof as a sham. The pillars of Society are shaken, but society goes on, since its pillars rest on sounder supports and eternal elements in human life.

Sagas of the Norse people provided Ibsen with his subjects for some early plays, since we see something stupendous in the *Vikings at Helgeland*, but the energy is not equalled by the art. Interest was awakened; unity maintained; but the whole enterprise is made to miscarry because of a little lie at the principal point of the plot. All Europe sat up shortly afterwards to wonder at *The Pretenders*, a portrayal of the human stuff of which kings can be made. Earl Skule has been regent during the childhood of Haakon, his nephew, and is reluctant to yield to the adult king. He can put on the king's crown and mantle; but "the king's life task is not his but Haakon's." The constant memory of this haunts him, while a contrary assurance gives Haakon insight and sureness. Cleverness is crucified since it fails before character. But when the war is over and Skule is slain, Haakon tells the secret about his uncle—"He was God's stepchild," suggesting that he was all but the very highest.

The Prussia of Bismarck was meanwhile invading and annexing Danish provinces, and Ibsen entered Copenhagen just as word came of the decisive defeat. He knew that the result was accomplished by Sweden and Norway holding aloof. Scornful of his people and bitter over his poverty, he turned to Italy for cheap living, and thence uttered the protest of his soul in *Brand*. Then it became clear that a prophet had indeed arisen. A Lutheran priest of great scholarship happens, during a vacation tour, to see distribution of food to a famine stricken community. Beyond the fiord, lashed to fury by the storm, lies a man half dead by a wound self-inflicted in despair. Who will carry religious comfort? Brand will go if a boat be available, but what boat can live in such a sea? Brand can navigate if some one will bale the boat to keep her afloat. Two lovers stand in the crowd, and when the man refuses to share the risk, the girl leaps forward. In such a situation Brand found

his soul-mate, his wife, and his parish. From such a sunless valley where Brand buries first his child and then his wife, he will not retire, but spends his life in one struggle with the sordidness of peasantry, and the vulgarity of voluptuous officials. At length, disgusted with it all, he calls his people to follow him to the ice-capped summits where alone one can find a sanctuary worthy of God. But nature rejects him; the avalanche sweeps down; Brand is overwhelmed; yet a voice is heard, "God is Love." Brand was merciless on himself and stern with others, even like the Master; but what a certainty in his creed, and a solid security in religion for his soul.

The next year a wealth of imaginative creation gave birth to *Peer Gynt*. Based on Norwegian legend, Peer is seen as the reckless youth; careless of honor; and ruthless in indulgence, and even when wealth comes his heartless indulgence increases. At last, returning to Norway, he is shipwrecked on the shore, and, like Jacob, comes to his home stripped of all he possessed. In the woods he discourses with a wild onion—a model of himself—nothing but one coat over another, no heart or core to be found. Two figures crowd on him. One demands his destruction as worthless, without character of any kind, good or evil; while the other calls him to the sulphur pits that a life basically sound may be purged of its dross. Dreading each doom in turn, Peer sees an open door and, entering the hut, is welcomed by Solveig, the girl whom he had deserted forty years before. With clamorous demands from those outside for a list of his sins, Solveig mothers the stricken man, assuring him that he has lived all these years in her hope; in her faith; in her heart. Redemptive suffering defies judgment and doom; vicarious sacrifice closes such a career with a song; and Peer finds salvation as Solveig soothes him to sleep.

In *A Doll's House* Ibsen reveals domestic tragedy even in comedy as he shows the futility of the conventional training of women to be mere dolls. But *Ghosts* went beyond the joke and in the story of inherited disease that haunted this young man's mind, Ibsen showed that the time had come when the conspiracy of silence must yield to a decision for discussion.

This leads us to the eternal question as to whether the truth should always be told. In defense of such, Ibsen published *An Enemy of the People*, in which a medical man is acclaimed for suc-

cess in discovering that his civic water supply is tainted. But presently house-holders and business men silence him lest the tourist trade should fall off. One by one those who applauded fall under the control active behind the smug conventions. When, penniless and homeless, the doctor has only his daughter to befriend him, he is proud of the part he has played; spurns the sacrifice; and revels in a freedom of a remarkable satisfaction. The other side, however, to all this is seen in *The Wild Duck* where a whole social group becomes wrecked, because some one, infatuated with veracity rather than with truth, feels bound to break some happy illusion which alone makes life tolerable, and we are made to wonder whether Ibsen turns to criticise himself, or perhaps he merely panders to what the public persistently demands in plays.

When Ibsen was nearing the sixties, and crying for deliverance, he seemingly wonders whether one can start afresh when old and escape the taint of heredity and the grip of social codes. We see "Hedda Gabler," who, after her marriage, remains primarily the daughter of General Gabler, rather than the wife of her uninteresting husband. Still will she realize herself, and when this is found impossible, surrender is avoided by suicide. Again in *Little Eyolf*, Ibsen drowns a boy rather than leave him to be made conformable to his mother's ideas—she dresses him in soldier clothes, though he is a cripple—and to his father's ambition to reproduce in the son a scholar like himself.

In the closing decade of the century Ibsen gave out his *Master Builder*. Here is the conflict of two generations; but the younger generation comes to Solness in three forms: as his own earlier life coming back, as the pressure of a younger artist displacing him as he had displaced the father, and as the nine dolls lying in an empty nursery since his wife lost her babies in a fire which Solness had planned to achieve other ends. He used to build churches to the honor of God but had told God one day that he was through. Then he built homes for human comfort and found it unsatisfying. He proposes now to build "castles in the air." What has wrought the change but the return to him of Hilda with whom, while a mere child, he had flirted that day he turned from God? Now she drives him on to build her one castle with a spire and to crown it as of old with a wreath. But he has lived so long on low levels that he can no longer stand at the height. He climbs and falls to

the pavement—dead. He could seek to regain the past but alas had to die in the effort.

Ibsen scorned middle class conventions, and if we would understand our own young people it may be worth while to see what Ibsen saw, even if we finally reject his judgment. Some aspects of Puritanism call for compensation in creative art and creative ways of life, and the way out of that life which Ibsen pictured as stunted is not easy nor is it readily found, but Ibsen found his task and toiled at it like a master, and for this generation, at least, his voice will not cease to echo, while there be many modern writers who are about to die, and should therefore at least, salute him.

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